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The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. t
ThisArticle broadly examines the conservative Rehnquist Court's federalism doctrines and, in
doing so, explores the connections between judicial conservatism and a commitment to federalism.
Three conclusions emerge First, although the Court has moved aggressively to advance federalism
through well-known doctrines, it frequently proves more substantively conservative than it does pro-
federalism when deference to state processes would shield liberal outcomes from federal reversal Sec-
ond, path dependence largely explains why the Court, to the puzzlement of some; has relied heavily on
sovereign immunity doctrine while proceeding cautiously in limiting Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause. Third, when path dependence precludes the Court from advancing its vision
through constitutional holdings, the pro-federalism majority has deployed a phalanx of sub-
constitutional devices to protect local governments; especially from private lawsuits seeking damage&
Overall, the Court's federalism revolution is distinctively a lawyers' revolution, with much of the sig-
nificance inhabiting the often Byzantine details
INTRODUCTION
It seems agreed on all sides now that the Supreme Court has an
agenda of promoting constitutional federalism.' Since the appointment
of Clarence Thomas in 1991 to fill the seat formerly occupied by Thur-
good Marshall, the Court has maintained a relatively stable five-justice
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to David Barron, Barry Friedman,
Elena Kagan,John Manning, Dan Meltzer, and David Shapiro for insightful comments on previous
drafts and to Greg Rapawy and Kevin Walsh for excellent research assistance.
I See, for example, Symposium: Federalism after Alden, 31 Rutgers LJ 630 (2000) (noting that
the "change in personnel" on the Court "enabled the federalism-enforcing side to gain ascendancy");
Alan J.Heinreich,Symposium:New Directionsin Federalism:Introduction,33 Loyola LA L Rev 1275
(2000) (examining the new judicially enforcable federalism doctrine outlined by the Court in Alden);
Symposium: State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 809
(2000) (examining the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
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majority -consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas- committed to enforcing limits on national
power and to protecting the integrity of the states. Over that period, the
Court has held at least ten federal statutes to be constitutionally invalid,
either in whole or in part, on grounds involving federalism. 2 By contrast,
the Court had found only one federal statute to violate principles of
constitutional federalism during the previous span of more than fifty
years, and it actually reversed the single anomalous decision less than
ten years later.' Commentators unhesitatingly refer to a federalism
"revival."5 Law reviews echo with discussion of whether the Court has
yet achieved, or is likely to effect, a federalism "revolution. 6
2 See Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama v Garrett,531 US 356,372-74(2001) (hold-
ing the Americans with Disabilities Act invalid insofar as it attempted to abrogate the states' sover-
eign immunity from suit); United States v Morrison,529 US 598,602 (2000) (invalidating portions of
the Violence Against Women Act as an attempted exercise of legislative power reserved to the
states); Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62,67 (2000) (holding the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act invalid insofar as it purported to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Alden v
Maine,527 US 706,712 (1999) (holding the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA') unconstitutional in-
sofar as it purported to subject unconsenting states to private suits in state court); College Savings
Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 US 666,691 (1999) (holding
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act invalid insofar as it purported to abrogate state sovereign
immunity);Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v College Savings Bank, 527 US
627,630 (1999) (invalidating the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act as
applied to the states); Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the
Brady Act requiring state and local governmental officials to execute a federal regulatory program);
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44,47 (1996) (invalidating a provision of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court); United States v Lopez, 514 US 549,551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act
on the ground that it exceeded congressional power and invaded the states' regulatory domain); New
York v United States, 505 US 144,149 (1992) (invalidating "take-title" provision of Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Act on grounds that Congress may not compel the states to assume liability). See
also City ofBoerne v Flores, 521 US 507,536 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
unconstitutional, largely on separation-of-powers grounds, insofar as it imposed obligations on state
and local governments).
3 See National League of Cities v Usery,426 US 833,852 (1976) (invalidating minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the FLSA as applied to certain functions of state and local governments).
4 See Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528,531 (1985) (holding
that states are not exempt from complying with the minimum wage and overtime requirements of
the FLSA).
5 See, for example, Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 Harv L Rev 2180,2213 (1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: United
States Term Limits, Inc. v.Thornton, 109 Harv L Rev 78,80 (1995).
6 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv L
Rev 4,129 (2001) (referring to a "revolution" in federalism doctrine); Charles A. Fried, Revolutions?,
109 Harv L Rev 13,34 (1995) (weighing but rejecting the view that the Court has taken revolutionary
steps); Steven G. Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers". In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich L Rev 752,752 (1995) (terming the Court's decision in Lopez "revo-
lutionary"). But see Robert F Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 Ga St U L Rev 985, 1003-04 (1997)
(characterizing the Court's federalism agenda as "modest and equivocal"). See also Judith Olans
Brown and Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 Hastings Con L Q 1,1 (2000) (observing that
the Court's federalism decisions "portend a jurisprudential sea-change").
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In the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival, as it has developed so
far, three categories of cases dominate the foreground. The first consists
of cases restraining Congress's power to regulate private conduct under
the Commerce Clause. By limiting Congress's regulatory capacity, deci-
sions such as United States v Lopez7 preserve spheres in which state and
local governments are the exclusive lawgivers.The second prominent line
of federalism cases establishes limits on Congress's authority directly to
regulate state and local governments. Widely noted decisions have struck
down legislation that attempted to "commandeer" state and local offi-
cials and compel their execution of a federally mandated agenda.8 A
third line of decisions involves the Eleventh Amendment and state sov-
ereign immunity! Subject only to narrow exceptions, these cases establish
that Congress cannot compel the states to submit to private suits for
money damages even when they violate federal rights.
Given these well-known lines of cases and the Court's recent record
of invalidating federal statutes, no one should doubt that the Rehnquist
Court has made the promotion of federalism an important priority.'° Sur-
prisingly, however, few if any scholars have carefully examined the over-
all pattern of Rehnquist Court decisions involving constitutional federal-
ism. My first goal in this Article is to fill the resulting gap in the litera-
7 514 US 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act on the ground that it ex-
ceeded congressional power and invaded the states' regulatory power).
8 See Printz, 521 US at 935; New York, 505 US at 175.
9 See, for exampleAlden, 527 US 706; College Savings Bank,527 US 666;Seminole Tribe,517
US 44.
10 Each Court term brings important new decisions. The October 2000 Term, for example, in-
cluded Garrett, 531 US 356, 372-74 (holding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity from private suits for damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act). At the
time of this writing, for the 2001 Term, the Court had already granted certiorari in five sovereign im-
munity cases: BellAtlantic Maryland Inc v MCI WorldCom, 240 F3d 279 (4th Cir 2001) (raising the
questions whether states implicitly waive their sovereign immunity when they participate in the regu-
latory scheme of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and whether Congress may require such a waiver
as a condition of state participation), cert granted as United States v Public Service Commission of
Maryland, 121 S Ct 2548 (2001); South Carolina State Ports Authority v Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, 243 F3d 165 (4th Cir 2001) (presenting the question whether state sovereign immunity applies
in an administrative proceeding brought by a private party before a federal agency), cert granted as
Federal Maritime Commission v South Carolina State PortsAuthority, 121 S Ct 392 (2001); Lapides v
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 251 F3d 1372 (11th Cir 2001) (involving
whether sovereign immunity requires a federal court to dismiss federal claims against a state on the
motion of a state attorney general who had asserted the court's jurisdiction over those claims as a ba-
sis for removal), cert granted, 122 S Ct 456 (2001); Illinois Bell Telephone Co v WorldCom Technolo-
gie.S Inc, 179 F3d 566 (7th Cir 1999) (presenting the issue whether state commission acceptance of
congressional invitation to implement a federal regulatory scheme making commission determina-
tions reviewable in federal court constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity), cert
granted as Mathias v WorldCom Technologies, Inc, 121 S Ct 1224 (2001); Regents of the University of
Minnesota v Raygor, 620 NW2d 680 (Minn 2001) (presenting the question whether a federal tolling
statute, 28 USC § 1367(d) (1994), can be applied to abrogate a state law time limit on a state's waiver
of sovereign immunity from suit), cert granted as Raygor v Regents of the University of Minnesota,
121 S Ct 2214 (2001).
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ture. Looking beyond the three categories of cases that have dominated
recent discussions, this Article surveys a broader sample of doctrines in-
volving, for example, the constitutionally permissible scope of state regu-
latory authority, federal preemption of state law, Supreme Court review
of state court judgments, federal judicial "abstention" in favor of state
adjudication, and canons of statutory interpretation and judicially fash-
ioned rules of "official immunity" which protect governments and their
officials from legal liability.
When the lens is thus broadened, three notable conclusions emerge.
First, the Court's federalism revolution includes what I shall describe as a
number of "quiet fronts" -areas in which the Court has done little or
nothing to promote federalism, despite having the opportunity to do so.
For example, the Court has done more to tighten than to loosen the
restrictions that the so-called dormant Commerce Clause imposes on
state and local governments." Moreover, some of the Court's most
prominently pro-federalism justices are quick to find that federal
regulatory statutes displace or preempt state regulations.1
Second, among the three lines of cases widely thought to constitute
the federalism revival, there is an interesting divergence of approaches.
Although the Court has imposed limits on Congress's general regulatory
powers, its decisions in that domain have displayed a cautious tentative-
ness. Notably, the Court has not overruled a single case upholding con-
gressional power to regulate commercial activities. Recent cases have put
regulation of noncommercial activity largely off-limits to Congress, but it
remains unclear whether this restriction will have broad significance.' 3
Similarly, cases restricting Congress's power directly to regulate state and
local governments have taken a narrow approach." Although the Court
has erected prohibitions against federal legislation that singles out state
and local governments and compels the performance of distinctively
governmental functions, it has not questioned Congress's authority to
impose other kinds of regulatory burdens. Perhaps most significantly, the
Court has left standing the holding of Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,'5 under which federal statutes generally regulating
11 See notes 202-15 and accompanying text.
12 See notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
13 See Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here:Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist
Court, 31 Rutgers L J 741,744 (2000) (predicting that "[e]ven if the Court occasionally strikes down
an Act as beyond Congress' enumerated powers, on the whole, it will continue to give Congress wide
latitude").
14 See Matthew D. Adler and Seth F Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Print, and Yeskey, 1998 S Ct Rev 71, 143 (arguing that the Court's decisions leave open other
equally effective mechanisms for federal control or displacement of state policies and thus do little
beyond establishing an "etiquette" of permissible federal action).
15 469 US 528 (1985).
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terms and conditions of employment can apply to state and local gov-
ernments on the same basis as to other employers.1
6
In comparison, recent decisions involving state sovereign immunity
have effected bold revisions in the doctrinal structure.7 Trumpeting the
value of state sovereignty, the Court has overruled at least two prece-
dents within the past five years. ' In another recent case, the justices
broke new ground by holding that the Constitution incorporates a prin-
ciple of state sovereign immunity that applies as much in state courts as
in federal courts.'9
Third, the Rehnquist Court's efforts to advance federalism are by no
means limited to constitutional rulings. On the contrary, many of the
most important protections that the Court has afforded to state, and es-
pecially to local, governments and their officials formally involve statu-
tory interpretation. Through equitable doctrines, interpretive canons, and
other devices of statutory construction, the Court has conferred protec-
tions that would be difficult if not impossible to derive directly from the
Constitution. If the Court's federalism revival has some quiet fronts, it
also includes some areas of important activity that have largely escaped
public notice.
Against the background of these empirical conclusions, my second
principal aim in this Article is to account for the variegated, sometimes
puzzling, pattern of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions. My ex-
planatory thesis includes three main themes, which roughly correspond
wvith my three principal descriptive claims.
The first explanatory theme involves judicial conservatism. In some
senses of the term, the current Court is indisputably a conservative one,2
and a commitment to protecting federalism constitutes a core component
of conservative judicial philosophies. 2' As I shall emphasize, however, the
16 Id at 554-57.
17 Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 S Ct Rev 1,2
(noting that "the Court's most... aggressive efforts have focused on the arcane doctrine of state sov-
ereign immunity").
18 See College Savings Bank,527 US at 680 (permitting constructive waiver of state immunity
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act), overruling Parden v Terminal Railway oftheAlabama
State Docks Department, 377 US 184 (1964); Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 66, overruling Pennsylvania v
Union Gas Co,491 US 1 (1989) (granting Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Commerce Clause).
19 See Alden,527 US at754.
20 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Further Thoughts,54 Okla L Rev 59,61 (2001) (char-
acterizing the Court as "conservative"); Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of
Alden, 76 Notre Dame L Rev 1113,1131-32 (2001) (noting that the liberal legacy of the Warren
Court has given way in response to "steadily conservative judicial appointments").
21 See, for example, Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching fora Way to Enforce Fed-
eralism,31 Rutgers LJ 631,635-36 (2000) (identifying judicial enforcement of federalism as a "con-
servative" aim). For a general discussion, see M. David Gelfand and Keith Werhan, Federalism and
Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices
O'Connor and Scalia, 64 Tulane L Rev 1443 (1990) (comparing the "conservative" approaches to
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"conservative" label is easier to apply than to define. In particular, the
relationship between a commitment to constitutional federalism and
other conservative values is by no means always obvious. In many if not
most cases,judicial protection of federalism has the effect of limiting lib-
eral forces and doctrines. Sometimes, however, state and local decision-
making produces outcomes that judicial conservatives find substantively
objectionable-for example, restrictive zoning schemes, or complex tan-
gles of regulations for interstate businesses to navigate, or interpretations
of the federal Constitution that give broad protections to criminal defen-
dants.
To put my conclusion in a nutshell, the substantive conservatism of
the Court's majority explains most, if not all, of the quiet fronts in the
federalism revival. The Court's pro-federalism majority is at least as sub-
stantively conservative as it is pro-federalism. When federalism and sub-
stantive conservatism come into conflict, substantive conservatism fre-
quently dominates.
My second explanatory theme involves the crucial, albeit limited,
significance of path dependence in Supreme Court adjudication.2 As I
shall use the term, "path dependence" functions as a capsule reference to
various ways in which history and surrounding attitudes and expectations
influence judicial decisionmaking.2 Within my usage, the phenomenon of
federalism of Justices O'Connor and Scalia).
22 For other efforts to explain and criticize patterns of legal decisionmaking by reference to the
notion of path dependence, see, for example, Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L Rev 601 (2001) (using
"path dependence theory" to explore the influence of history on our common law system); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path Dependence, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 169 (1992) (exam-
ining when and why the common-law process will be path dependent and arguing that such depend-
ence is "benign"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802,814-23
(1982) (exploring criticisms of the Court, including a challenge to the Court as an institution based
on its inconsistent decisions).
23 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv L Rev 641,643 (1996),
introduces the concept with exemplary lucidity:
Consider the most basic instance of path dependency. We are on a road and wonder why it
winds and goes here instead of there, when a straight road would have been much easier to
drive. Today's road depends on what path was taken before ... It is time to resurface the road.
Should today's authorities straighten it out at the same time? They see no reason to raze the
factories and housing developments that arose on the path's bends... Today's road, dependent
on the path taken ... decades ago, is not the one the authorities would lay down if they were
choosing their road today. But society, having invested in the path itself and in the resources
alongside the path, is better off keeping the winding road on its current path than paying to
build another.
In the economic literature, the forms and significance of path dependence are much debated, with
special focus on the question whether historical events can have the effect of locking markets into in-
efficient equilibria. Compare W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Econ-
omy 14-15 (Michigan 1994) (arguing that path dependence can lock in inefficiencies), with SJ. Lie-
bowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J L, Econ, & Org 205,
224 (1995) (concluding that "[r]emedial inefficiency" resulting from path dependence is empirically
rare). With this question in mind, economists have categorized a variety of stronger and weaker
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path dependence encompasses the legal concept of stare decisis-the ba-
sic idea that past decisions must generally (though not always) be ac-
cepted as binding authorities, even by the Supreme Court,24 and that legal
reasoning in current cases should be consistent with judicial precedents.'
But the notion of path dependence also links the legal force of precedent
with an implication that the Court feels constrained by surrounding atti-
tudes in the public and political culture.26 Absent unusually strong foun-
forms of path dependence, involving differing effects of earlier decisions and developments on the
achievement of economically efficient current outcomes. See Liebowitz and Margolis, 11 J L, Econ, &
Org at 206-07 (sketching three conceptions of path dependence that assert "progressively stronger
claims" concerning the effect of past developments on the definition and attainment of contempo-
rary efficiencies). See also Roe, 109 Harv L Rev at 646-52 (developing a similar typology recognizing
three types of path dependence).Though important in their own right, debates about the capacity of
market and related mechanisms to achieve efficiency are largely irrelevant for the purposes of this
Article. The only proposition on which I mean to insist is one that is not seriously disputed:
"[S]ensitive dependence on initial conditions [can] lead[ ] to outcomes that are regrettable" from
some evaluative perspective, because a better outcome would have been possible if earlier events
had unfolded differently, yet now"[are too] costly to change" Liebowitz and Margolis, 11 J L,Econ,
& Org at 207.
24 For discussions of stare decisis, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the
Constitution:An Essay on Constitutional Methodology,76 NYU L Rev 570 (2001) (arguing that stare
decisis is a principle rooted in the Constitution and not merely a policy choice); John Harrison, The
Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,50 Duke L J 503 (2000) (characterizing stare decisis
as a constitutionally permissible common law rule); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Consti-
tutionalAdjudication, 88 Colum L Rev 723 (1988) (defending stare decisis and discussing its com-
patibility with conceptions of originalism); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested
in a Precedent Stare Decisis the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 BU L Rev 345 (1986) (con-
cluding that stare decisis should be abandoned in constitutional adjudication).
25 Ronald Dworkin has sought to illuminate the characteristic role of precedent in legal rea-
soning by analogy to the task of an author charged with writing a chapter in a "chain novel," the pre-
vious chapters of which were written by other authors; each successive author retains creative license,
including a capacity to reshape plot and character, but the license is restrained by obligations of tex-
tual integrity and of coherence with what has gone before. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 228-
32 (Belknap 1986). For an insightful argument that the history of the Eleventh Amendment exempli-
fies Dworkin's theory of law as an unfolding narrative, see David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Elev-
enth Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv L Rev 61,61-63 (1984).
26 See generally Robert G.McCloskey, TheAmerican Supreme Court 231 (Chicago 3d ed 2000)
(arguing that the Supreme Court "has learned to be a political institution and to behave accord-
ingly");Robert A.Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J Pub L 279,283-85 (1957) (arguing that the Supreme Court is typically part of the nation's
governing coalition and generally tends to reflect prevailing political preferences).
Some theories of stare decisis subsume considerations of public attitudes and perceptions ofju-
dicial legitimacy as legally relevant considerations, at least in cases of great public moment. See
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833,864-69 (1992) (adhering to
the central holding of Roe v Wade on stare decisis grounds and asserting, among its reasons, the need
to preserve both "the substance and [public] perception" of its "legitimacy"); Deborah Helman, The
Importance ofAppearing Principled, 37 Ariz L Rev 1107,1109 (1995) (identifying a "prudential con-
ception of stare decisis, in which the Court treats the effect of a decision on the esteem in which the
Court is held as a significant factor to be weighed in the analysis"). By contrast, "traditional" concep-
tions of stare decisis acknowledge the significance of public reliance on judicial decisions, but deny
that the Court may properly take into account "the effect of Court action on the Court's image."
Hellman,37 Ariz L Rev at 1109. See also Casey, 505 US at 997-98 (Scalia dissenting) (denouncing a
judicial concern with public perceptions in determining whether to adhere to precedent as "not a
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dations in constitutional text and the evolving public sense of fairness or
necessity, the Court may believe that it would risk public confidence if,
especially by a narrow margin, it were simultaneously to reverse its own
precedent and to dramatically alter settled schemes of rights and respon-
sibilities.7
Also encompassed within my capacious conception of path depend-
ence is the idea that as the Court proceeds along a doctrinal path, both it
and the attentive public assess what the justices may properly do next in
light of past experiences.2 Within this calculus, some lines of develop-
ment look singularly unattractive because they would require the Court
to move in directions that previously proved disastrous. For the Court to
do so would not only violate principles of stare decisis, but also hazard
confidence in the Court's collective sobriety of judgment: "If reasoning
implies continuity for him who engages in it, all the more must it do so
for those to whom it is addressed and who are asked to accept it."2' By
contrast, the Court may believe that it has made and can continue to
make steady, even if meandering, progress along paths where it has pre-
viously proceeded without palpable misstep. '
Among my theses in this Article is that considerations of path de-
pendence must loom large in any plausible explanation of why the Court
has acted with such relative caution in reshaping constitutional doctrines
involving Congress's general regulatory powers and its related authority
to impose obligations on state and local governments under the Com-
merce and Spending Clauses. The Court's effort to restrict Congress's
general regulatory powers occasioned embarrassment and near disaster
during the economic and political crises of the 1930s. Then, when the
Court shifted course and authorized broad assertions of congressional
power, patterns of reliance developed. The Court's more recent efforts to
enforce broadly applicable restrictions on Congress's regulation of state
and local governments also ended in a sharp reversal." Although eager to
promote federalism through modest doctrinal reform and to shape new
options for the future, the Court now hesitates to take aggressive steps,
threatening entrenched regulatory regimes back into territory that it
previously abandoned. By contrast, the path of sovereign immunity doc-
principle of law ... but a principle of Realpolitik-and a wrong one at that").
27 See Casey, 505 US at 864-69.
28 See Hathaway, 86 Iowa L Rev at 604 (cited in note 22) (asserting that "'path dependence'
means that an outcome is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it
... with each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage").
29 Charles A. Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 Harv L Rev 1140,1156 (1994).
30 See Arthur, Increasing Returns at 152 (cited in note 23) (suggesting that "humans tend to
over-exploit 'good' actions that pay off well early thereby inheriting the classic properties of strong
self-reinforcement: path dependence ... and possible lock-in to an inferior choice").
31 See Part III.B.2.
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trine now appears to the Court as one along which it has so far pro-
gressed successfully and can travel without serious hazard.
My third explanatory theme involves what might be called the
Court's doctrinal opportunism in promoting federalism and, in particular,
in protecting governmental treasuries from damages liability. Especially
when considerations of path dependence have made it difficult for the
Court to protect its vision of federalism through direct constitutional rul-
ings, the pro-federalism majority has relied on an array of other devices,
including judge-made equitable doctrines, pro-federalism principles of
statutory construction, and official immunity rules. The result is an inele-
gant patchwork of protective doctrines that makes it exceedingly diffi-
cult-even when not constitutionally impossible-for private plaintiffs to
recover money damages from state and local governments and their offi-
cials.
When the dense cluster of subconstitutional protections for state
and local governments comes into view, it becomes relatively easy to an-
swer an otherwise perplexing question: Why has the Court made sover-
eign immunity a centerpiece of its federalism revival? As critics have
noted, sovereign immunity doctrine appears a crude tool for promoting
federalism.n Even in theory, state sovereign immunity does not bar con-
gressional regulation of the states, nor does it excuse the states from
constitutional commands.4T The doctrine's only effect is to thwart suits to
enforce valid legal obligations-most paradigmatically, private suits for
money damages seeking payment directly from a state's treasury as
compensation for past harms.What is more, sovereign immunity doctrine
is often easy to evade by a properly pleaded suit against a state official,
rather than against the state itself35 And sovereign immunity has never
been understood to give any protection to county and local govern-
32 See, for example, Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory,75 Notre Dame L Rev 1011,1052 (2000) (calling the use of sovereign immunity doctrine to
achieve federalist goals "ineffectual and counterproductive"); Young, 1999 S Ct Rev at 2 (cited in
note 17); Charles A. Fried, Supreme Court Folly, NY Tunes A17 (July 6,1999) (describing the Court's
heavy reliance on sovereign immunity to promote federalism as "using a screwdriver to pound
nails").
33 See Kimel, 528 US at 78-79,91 (acknowledging congressional authority to enact the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and to make it binding on states, but holding that the states enjoy
sovereign immunity from unconsented private suits for damages under the Act).
34 See Alden, 527 US at 755 (affirming that notwithstanding the states' sovereign immunity,
"[t]he States and their officers are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal
statutes that comport with the constitutional design").
35 See id at 756-57; John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983,
84 Va L Rev 47,49-50,59 (1998) (pointing out that officer suits under Section 1983 provide a way
around sovereign immunity); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception",110 Harv
L Rev 102,103 (1996) (arguing that despite the Court's vocal support of sovereign immunity, states
are effectively accountable for violations of federal law through properly pleaded actions against
state officials).
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ments.3 Why, anyone might wonder, does the Court believe that the
game is worth the candle?
The answer, quite simply, is that it is a mistake to consider sovereign
immunity in isolation from other, mostly subconstitutional doctrines that
have been largely overlooked in prominent commentary on the Court's
federalism revival. Taking opportunities where it finds them, the Court
has deployed a phalanx of statutory, equitable, and interpretive doctrines
to protect state and local treasuries from damages liability. The scheme
of protections that the Court has put in place is incomplete and some-
times penetrable, but far from ineffectual.
As is probably evident already, my ambitions in this Article are large
along two dimensions, but modest along a third. Along one dimension, I
offer a broad (although not entirely comprehensive) survey of the Su-
preme Court's recent work in crafting and applying doctrines affecting
constitutional federalism. Along another, I advance an ambitious, multi-
part explanation of the Court's diverse pattern of decisions. But my ex-
planation is entirely positive. Although I shall offer a few evaluative re-
marks, this Article does not pretend to make any significant contribution
to normative debates about federalism or the appropriate judicial role in
promoting it.
The Article unfolds as follows. Part I introduces three concepts cru-
cial to consideration of the Supreme Court's federalism revival-
federalism, state sovereignty and sovereign immunity, and judicial con-
servatism. This Part identifies diverse strands among conservative judi-
cial philosophies and preliminarily explores the connections between ju-
dicial conservatism and a commitment to federalism. Part II reviews ju-
dicial doctrines affecting constitutional federalism. It calls attention to
the Court's comparative caution along some doctrinal paths and its rela-
tive boldness in stiffening sovereign immunity doctrine. Part II also iden-
tifies quiet fronts in the federalism revolution.
Part III offers a positive theoretical explanation of the mixed pic-
ture revealed in Part II. Part III invokes the substantive conservatism of
the pro-federalism justices to account for the Court's failure to move
more aggressively along certain quiet fronts. To explain the Court's cau-
tion in reshaping constitutional doctrine along other paths, Part III
points to phenomena associated with path dependence. Path dependence
also unravels part of the mystery of the Court's heavy reliance on sover-
eign immunity; in attempting to promote federalism, the Court has pro-
gressed most aggressively along the path where history has made it most
36 See, for example, Garrett, 531 US at 369 ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not extend to
units of local government."); Alden, 527 US at 756 (same); Mount Healthy Board of Education v
Doyle, 429 US 274,280-81 (1977) (finding that whether a board of education is subject to suit de-
pends upon whether it is a branch of the state government, or rather a separate entity like a county
or city government).
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confident. But Part III also argues that in order to grasp the role of sov-
ereign immunity in the Court's federalism agenda, it is vital to under-
stand how sovereign immunity interacts with subconstitutional doctrines
to protect state and local governments and their officials against suits for
money damages.
Part IV seeks perspective on the Court's federalism revival by ex-
amining the jurisprudential assumptions that underlie leading cases. This
Part concludes that the Court's opinions are methodologically eclectic. If
the Court's federalism agenda has been modest in some respects, it is ag-
gressive and relatively undisciplined in others. Part V offers a brief con-
clusion.
I. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
By all accounts, the current conservative Supreme Court is eager to
protect federalism and sovereign immunity as an aspect of federalism.37
Despite a blizzard of commentary, the central terms are often linked
without much probing. What is federalism? What is sovereign immunity,
and how does it relate to federalism? What is judicial conservatism, and
why is support for federalism, and sovereign immunity as an aspect of
federalism, a conservative position? Before more substantive analysis, it
will help to pause over the concepts of federalism, sovereign immunity,
and judicial conservatism and to explore ways in which they relate to
each other.
A. Federalism
There is no agreed-upon definition of constitutional federalism. As a
structural principle, federalism requires that power should be divided
among layers of government. As the Constitution makes plain, the na-
tional government was designed to be one of limited powers,' with cen-
tral responsibilities retained for the states.39 Beyond these generalities lie
37 See, for example, Althouse, 31 Rutgers L J at 635-40 (cited in note 21) (contrasting the pre-
vailing majority's "conservative" view of sovereign immunity with that of the "liberal side"); Herbert
Hovenkamp,Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism" The Supreme Court's Lopez and Semi-
nole Tribe Decisions, 96 Colum L Rev 2213,2245 (1996) (noting that "the conservatives on the Court
carried the day" in advancing an abstract principle of state sovereignty and state sovereign immu-
nity).
38 See US Const Amend X; Federalist 45 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Pa-
pers 292-93 (Mentor 1961) ("The powers delegated... to the federal government are few and de-
fined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.").
39 See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution
161-202 (Knopf 1996) (describing shared and debated understandings among the Constitution's
Framers and ratifiers). According to Rakove: "The existence of the states was simply a given fact of
American governance" that the Framers never doubted that they needed to accommodate. Id at 162.
Consistent with this design, much of the most basic law is historically if not necessarily state law. See
David L. Shapiro, Federalism:A Dialogue 114-15 (Northwestern 1995) (noting that control over
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deep disagreements about how precisely the federalism principle should
be specified and implemented.
Interestingly, however, nearly all agree" -as the Supreme Court has
emphasized" -that federalism serves important values. 3 First, in com-
parison with the national government, state and local governments are
closer to the people and more capable of reflecting local needs, values,
and mores. M Second, the diversity of state and local governments permits
experiment and competition.5 If successful, an apt3roach initiated in one
place can be replicated elsewhere. Third, apart from its capacity to pro-
mote government that delivers goods and services effectively, federalism
fosters connection and community.6 In a nation of nearly three hundred
million people, the national government is inevitably remote. By con-
regulations concerning daily life remains with the states). This includes most criminal, tort, and con-
tract law, and nearly all property and family law. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
Vand L Rev 1485,1504 (1994) (describing the chief structural, political and cultural factors responsi-
ble for shaping the allocation of power between the national government and the states).
40 See, for example, Jackson, 111 Harv L Rev at 2219 (cited in note 5) (disputing the definition
offered by other commentators).
41 A prominent, provocative exception is Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L Rev 903,907 (1994) (arguing that the purported
benefits of federalism would either be attainable through a "decentralization" of national administra-
tion or are illusory). For a persuasive rejoinder, see Jackson, 111 Harv L Rev at 2213-19 (cited in
note 5). At the end of the day, the strongest arguments advanced by Rubin and Feeley are, first, that
the values of federalism (or "localism," as they call it) are sometimes outweighed in particular cases
by competing values that call for nationalizing solutions and, second, that the sense of membership in
the national political community is often more salient than the sense of membership in more local
communities. See Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 948-50.
42 See, forexample, Printz v United States,521 US898,918-22 (1997) (discussing the merits ofa
"dual sovereignty" regime); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452,458 (1991) (describing the advantages of
a "federalist structure").
43 See, for example, Jackson, 111 Harv L Rev at 2213-28 (cited in note 5); Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn L Rev 317,386-405 (1997); Shapiro, Federalism at 75-106 (cited in note
39); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Cen-
tury, 88 Colum L Rev 1,5-10 (1988). But see Richard Briffault, "WhatAbout the 'Ism'?" Normative
and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1303,1305-06 (1994) (arguing that
it is crucial not to confuse the values served by localism or decentralization with the structure of
states and federalism that is protected by the Constitution).
44 See, for example, Gregory, 501 US at 458.
45 See United States v Lopez,514 US 549,581 (1995) (Kennedy concurring) ("States may per-
form their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solu-
tion is far from clear."); Gregory, 501 US at 458; San Antonio Independent School District v Rodri-
guez, 411 US 1, 49-50 (1973) (identifying experimentation as a benefit of local control); New State Ice
Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting) (recognizing the Court's power to limit
experimentation and warning against applying capricious limitations); Michael W. McConnell, Feder-
alism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 1484,1498 (1987) (arguing that federalism
creates the competition that in turn fosters innovation in governmental function).
46 See, for example, Gregory,501 US at458;Jackson,111 Harv LRev at 2221 (cited in note 5);
Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 389-94 (cited in note 43); Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 7-8 (cited in note
43).
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trast, there are more opportunities to participate in government, and to
do so efficaciously, at the local level. 
4
Finally, state and local governments function as counterweights to
national power.4s At the time of the Constitution's framing, the states en-
joyed palpable checking capacities. State legislatures elected the mem-
bers of the United States Senate;49 state militias provided a potential
source of resistance to tyrannical assertions of federal authority.! Today,
the states' capacity to protect liberty depends on more subtle considera-
tions of allegiance and dependence. The role of state and local govern-
ments may divide citizens' allegiance and soften impulses to vest totaliz-
mng power in the national government.
When the values of federalism are tallied against the spare features
of the Constitution's design, a partial anomaly stands out. Nowhere does
the Constitution refer specifically to local governments. Yet in functional
analysis of the values that federalism serves, the significance of local
governments is enormous.With respect to some values-such as those of
political community or connectedness-local governments are likely to
be more important than the states.52 A jurisprudence of federalism that
ignores local governments would, therefore, be functionally (even if not
constitutionally) incomplete. Correlatively, arguments that invoke the
benefits of federalism to support judicial protection of state but not local
governments are likely to be at least partially mismatched with their con-
clusions. The question immediately arises whether such arguments do not
prove either too much or too little.
B. State Sovereignty, Sovereign Immunity, and the
Eleventh Amendment
The notion of state "sovereignty" is legally recurrent, but mysterious
nonetheless. In the inherited European tradition, the sovereign was the
single repository of ultimate lawmaking authority.53 In the American con-
47 See Shapiro, Federalism at 91-93 (cited in note 39); Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 7 (cited in
note 43).
48 See, for example, Printz,521 US at 921 ('[A] healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."'), quoting
Gregory, 501 US at 458.
49 SeeUSConstArtI,§3,cl1.
50 See DavidYassky, The SecondAmendment. Structure, History, and Constitutional Change,99
Mich L Rev 588,605-07 (2000) (describing state militias as a "counterweight" to the national army);
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L J 1425,1494-1500 (1987) (describing the
establishment of military powers under the Constitution).
51 See Lopez, 514 US at 576-77 (Kennedy concurring) (noting that "the Federal and State gov-
emments ... hold each other in check by competing for the affections of the people").
52 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 Va L Rev 633,688 n
262 (1993) ("[M]any of the'states' that are the historical and primary referents of federalism talk are
part of the problem of remote and nonparticipatory government.").
53 See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1430 (cited in note 50).
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text, the idea of sovereignty-and especially of state sovereignty-
proved problematic from the beginning." For one thing, the Constitution
identifies the ultimate lawgiver as "the People of the United States";" in
this formulation, the sovereign merges with its subjects.6 In addition, the
Constitution divides lawmaking authority between state and federal
governments and, accordingly, debars the states from performing a vari-
ety of functions."5 More generally, the states are subject to federal law and
the federal Constitution,' which authorizes Congress to enact legislation
that then binds the states.
Within this institutional scheme, the states are partly if not wholly
subordinate entities. They enjoy at most a residual sovereignty, consisting
of such elements as remain after recognition of both the ultimate author-
ity of "the People" and the superior juridical status of the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States. '9 What is perhaps more important,
the content of the states' residual sovereignty cannot be specified by
analysis of what "sovereignty," taken as a postulate, minimally or neces-
sarily entails. As the Supreme Court has recognized,"[t]he framers split
the atom of sovereignty,"6 ' and the allocation of entitlements and powers
among the resulting subatomic entities can only be defined by legal, his-
torical, and functional analysis.
Largely as a result of the way that the American Constitution re-
shapes traditional conceptions of sovereignty, fights have occurred from
the beginning about whether, and if so when, the states enjoy "sovereign
immunity" from suit. In Chisholm v Georgia," the Supreme Court deter-
mined that Article III of the Constitution, which contemplates federal
judicial jurisdiction of suits involving the states,"2 stripped the states of
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. Congress promptly re-
sponded by proposing, and the states by ratifying, the peculiarly worded
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution: "The judicial Power of the
54 See Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 Stan L Rev
1031,1043 (1997).
55 US Const Preamble. But see U.S. Term Limits, Inc v Thornton,514 US 779,846 (1995) (Tho-
mas dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of
each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.").
56 See United States v Lee, 106 US 196,208 (1882) ("Under our system the people, who are...
called subjects [under the frameworks of other governments], are the sovereign.").
57 These include making treaties, coining money, and conferring titles of nobility. See US Const
Art I,§ 10.
58 See US Const Art VI, § 3.
59 See Federalist 39 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 245 (Mentor
1961) (describing the states as possessing "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty").
60 Saenz v Roe,526 US 489,504 n 17 (1999) (Kennedy concurring),quoting Thornton,514 US
at 838.
61 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
62 See US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies between
two or more States ... [and to Controversies] between a State and Citizens of another State").
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United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eq-
uity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
''
3
Obviously enough, the Eleventh Amendment does not refer to
"state sovereign immunity." Equally obviously, the wording of the Elev-
enth Amendment embarrasses claims that the original design was
broadly to constitutionalize the states' immunity from suit. Read literally,
the Amendment would allow a state to be sued in federal court by its
own citizens, barring only suits by "Citizens of another State." To my
mind, the best explanation of the Eleventh Amendment is the "diversity
theory" developed during the 1980s by John Gibbons"' and William
Fletcher.5
The diversity theory emphasizes that Article III authorizes federal
jurisdiction on bases. Some grants of jurisdiction are premised on subject
matter-as, for example, when a suit "arises under" the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.M Others are predicated on party
status. For example, Article III authorizes federal "diversity" jurisdiction
when a suit is between a state and citizens of another state. 7 According
to the diversity theory, the Eleventh Amendment makes clear that Arti-
cle III does not strip the states of their immunity in actions-such as that
in Chisholm-brought under the federal diversity jurisdiction by "Citi-
zens of another State" asserting claims based on state law. If states wish
to assert sovereign immunity in suits under state law, nothing in Article
III bars them from doing so. But the Eleventh Amendment, according to
the diversity theory, does not invest the states with sovereign immunity
as a matter of federal constitutional law; it thus leaves Congress free to
subject the states to suit (by their own citizens, for example) in cases in
which Article III contemplates federal jurisdiction based on subject mat-
ter, such as on the ground that a suit arises under federal law.
I find the diversity interpretation attractive because it fits the lan-
guage of the Eleventh Amendment, because it is reasonably consistent
with the historical record, and because it seems to me to make practical
sense. Where the state is the lawgiver, it should be able (if it so chooses)
to cloak itself with immunity. By contrast, where federal law governs, it
63 US Const Amend XI.
64 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:A Reinterpretation,
83 Colum L Rev 1889 (1983) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was intended solely to grant
states immunity from suits in which the sole basis for federal jurisdiction was the presence of a di-
verse or alien party).
65 William Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Con-
struction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition against Jurisdiction, 35
Stan L Rev 1033 (1983) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to preclude federal
jurisdiction over suits against a state arising under federal law).
66 See US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
67 See id.
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seems to me inconsistent with federal supremacy for the states to be able
to defy their lawful obligations and claim immunity from suit.'
Although the Eleventh Amendment might have been construed
narrowly, and indeed was narrowly interpreted through the early years of
its history,6 the Supreme Court took a "wrong turn"' in its 1890 decision
in Hans v Louisiana." In Hans, the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment embodied a general principle of state sovereign immunity,"
which bars federal jurisdiction of suits by citizens against their own
states, even when those suits are based on alleged violations of the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States.7'
The Hans Court may have believed that no other path was open to
it. On its facts, the suit involved an action against a southern state for
failure to honor its bonds. 7 In the near aftermath of military reconstruc-
tion, there probably would have been no political will to enforce a judg-
ment against the state.73 And for the Court to enter a futile judgment
might have had disastrous repercussions for the status and authority of
the judicial branch.
The Court in Hans thus set out to develop a doctrine of state sover-
eign immunity that would be encompassing, but not too encompassing.
As the Court appeared to recognize, state sovereign immunity would un-
dermine the Constitution's supremacy if it rendered the states wholly
unanswerable in court for their violations of federal law. If state sover-
eign immunity were recognized, a series of exceptions would thus be
needed, and the Court began to list some even in Hans itself. Sovereign
immunity, the Court said, would not bar appeals to the Supreme Court
from state court judgments in suits (including criminal cases) to which a
68 See David L. Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: What Is Good Federalism?,31 Rutgers L J 753,754-
755 (2000) (arguing that when "state sovereign immunity does not limit national authority to impose
certain obligations on the states," no "independent value of federalism is served by inserting sover-
eign immunity as an additional barrier to effective enforcement of those obligations").
69 See, for example, Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264,383 (1821) (construing the Elev-
enth Amendment as inapplicable to suits by citizens of the defendant state and to all cases, regardless
of parties, "arising under the constitution or laws of the United States").
70 See Shapiro, 98 Harv L Rev at 63,70 (cited in note 25).
71 134 US 1 (1890).
72 See id at 15-16 (asserting that the "suability of a state without its consent was ... unknown to
law" and that the supposition the Eleventh Amendment might permit unconsented suits by a state's
own citizens "is almost an absurdity on its face").
73 See id at 15.
74 See id at 1-2.
75 See Shapiro, 98 Harv L Rev at 70 (cited in note 25) (stating that this decision was prompted
by "political exigencies" and was merely a recognition that efforts to coerce the states would prove
unenforceable); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1973-2003 (cited in note 64) (noting that the "Supreme
Court faced a draconian choice between repudiation of some of its most inviolable constitutional
doctrines and the humiliation of seeing its political authority compromised as its judgments met the
resistance of hostile state governments"); John V. Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, 1798-1908.A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U Ill L Rev 423,447-49 (observing that "the
end of Reconstruction signaled the end of easy enforceability of orders to the states").
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state was a party.76 Neither would sovereign immunity preclude suits
against a state by another staten or by the federal government.' nor suits
to which a state consented.9 Within a short time, the landmark case of Ex
parte Younga had also reinforced the principle, traceable to some of the
earliest decisions under the Eleventh Amendment,81 that although the
states cannot be sued in their own names, federal courts may entertain
suits for injunctions against state officers-even when the officers are
sued entirely for actions taken in their official capacities.' Nor was
Young the end. In the years since, the Court has continued to work out
functionally necessary or desirable exceptions to state sovereign immu-
nity.
Without descending into the morass of Eleventh Amendment doc-
trine, I would offer three summary observations. First, whatever the
Court's actual rationale for Hans, subsequent cases have ascribed values
to sovereign immunity, of which two have assumed special importance.
One involves the states' dignity: time and again, the Court pronounces it
inconsistent with the dignity of the states for them to be subject to un-
consented suits by private parties.n The other ascribed value involves the
states' financial stabilityY
Second, as I have noted already, exceptions to sovereign immunity
are at least as functionally important, and some are probably as well en-
trenched, as the basic rule traceable to Hans." As the Court has recog-
76 See Hans, 134 US at 19-20.
77 See id at 15.
78 See United States v Texas, 143 US 621,643-45 (1892) (concluding that the Court must have
jurisdiction over a case between the United States and a state).
79 See Hans, 134 US at 17.
8o 209 US 123 (1908).
81 See, for example, Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738,857-58 (1824)
(reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment applies only insofar as a state itself is a party in the re-
cord).
82 Young,209 US at 167-68. For a general discussion, see Alfred Hill, In Defense ofOur Law of
Sovereign Immunity, 42 BC L Rev 485,541-58 (2001) (describing the pattern of availability and
nonavailability of officer suits).
83 See, for example, A[den v Maine,527 US 706,715 (1999) ("The generation that designed and
adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.");
Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofldaho, 521 US 261, 287-88 (1997) ("The dignity and status of its
statehood allow Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity.");Seminole Tribe of Florida v
Florida, 517 US 44,58 (1996) (reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment exists to avoid the indignity
of subjecting states to private suits).
84 See Alden, 527 US at 750 ("Private suits against unconsenting states-especially suits for
money damages-may threaten the financial integrity of the states."). See also Board of Trustees of
University ofAlabama v Garrett, 531 US 356,370 (2001) (holding that Congress lacks Fourteenth
Amendment authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and noting that "it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for
a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use
existing facilities").
S5 See Young, 1999 S Ct Rev at 9 (cited in note 17) (noting that the Young fiction "went hand in
hand with the doctrine of sovereign immunity at common law, and it seems doubtful that the latter
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nized repeatedly, there must be mechanisms permitting the enforcement
of federal law against the states in order for federalism to be workable.6
Although easily overlooked, this is a point of enormous significance.
Even the staunchest judicial champions of state sovereign immunity are
not states-rights absolutists.' In seeking a compromise between national
authority and competing concerns of state governmental dignity and fi-
nancial integrity, proponents of sovereign immunity would simply strike
the balance at a different point than would their critics."
Third, sovereign immunity doctrine has grown vastly complex. Al-
though most sovereign immunity questions have tolerably clear answers,
they often lie at the end of a maze of precedents that only a specialist
could navigate with confidence. "
C. Judicial Conservatism
It is widely agreed that the current Supreme Court includes at least
five conservative justices and that commitments to federalism and sover-
eign immunity are part of a conservative judicial philosophy. But the
elements of judicial conservatism are multifarious." Provisionally, it may
help to distinguish among strands of conservatism that I shall describe as
substantive, methodological, and institutional.
doctrine would have taken the broad form that it took absent the moderating influence of the officer
remedy");Monaghan, 110 Harv L Rev at 127 (cited in note 35) ("To characterize Young as an excep-
tion ... gets the matter backward: the Eleventh Amendment is an exception to Young.").
86 See, for example, Alden, 527 US at 755-57 (noting that sovereign immunity "does not bar all
judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law" and that
"[e]stablished rules provide ample means to correct ongoing violations of federal law and to vindi-
cate the interests which animate the Supremacy Clause"); Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 US at 293
(O'Connor concurring) ("'Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are neces-
sary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law."'), quoting Green v Man-
sour, 474 US 64,68 (1985).
87 See Nagel, 13 Ga St U L Rev at 996 (cited in note 6) (observing that while it is not entirely
beyond the pale for nationalists on occasion to consider abolishing the states outright, an equivalent
pro-federalism proposal has not been mentioned, much less supported, by anyone on the Court or in
the academy).
88 See Althouse, 31 Rutgers L J at 647 (cited in note 21).
89 See Shapiro, 31 Rutgers L J at 758 (cited in note 68) ("[T]he total picture is a Byzantine ag-
gregation of rules and doctrines.").
90 See, for example, Althouse, 31 Rutgers L J at 635-40 (cited in note 21); Richard C. Kearney
and Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision Making: The Impact of Court Composition on
State and Local Government Litigation,54 J Pol 1008 (1992) (finding that the conservative ideology
of the justices is the most important factor in explaining variable success rates of state and local gov-
ernments in Supreme Court litigation).
91 See, for example, Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 NC L Rev 619,661 (1994) ("American conservatism is highly splin-
tered."); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Ju-
dicial Conservatism, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 301,302-07 (1993) (distinguishing between two entirely
separate "judicial-conservative projects"); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutional-
ism, 88 Mich L Rev 641,651-62 (1990) (distinguishing types of conservatism and attempting to iden-
tify universal conservative ideals).
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1. Substantive conservatism.
Along one dimension, judges and justices are widely counted as
conservative when they tend to reach substantive conclusions generally
associated with a conservative outlook. To identify substantively conser-
vative positions, I shall rely on the categorizing scheme employed by the
political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth in a number of
prominent studies that predict the votes of Supreme Court justices by
reference to their political "attitudes" or ideologies, as measured by
newspaper editorials published at the time of their appointments.9 Segal
and Spaeth divide "civil liberties" cases from "economic" cases. Within
that scheme, conservative judicial positions are those disfavoring "the
criminally accused" and "civil rights/civil liberties claimant[s],"' except in
affirmative action and Takings Clause cases, where the conservative posi-
tion is pro-claimant. In economic cases, conservative positions are anti-
union, pro-business (in cases involving challenges to the government's
regulatory authority), anti-liability, and anti-injured-person.'
This categorical scheme is obviously crude. Self-identified political
conservatives include both libertarians, who generally believe that that
government governs best which governs least, and social conservatives,
who favor governmental regulations to protect traditional values and
structures.' Segal and Spaeth do not attempt to identify unifying values
and concerns. Insofar as they aim to reflect prevalent cultural under-
standings of which positions count as liberal and which as conservative,
their scheme may also be slightly dated, especially with respect to free
speech issues.?9 In recent years, some of the justices usually identified as
92 See Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 65
(Cambridge 1993).
93 See Jeffrey A.Segal, et al, Ideological Values and the Votes of US. Supreme Court Justices Re-
visited,57 J Pol 812 (1995) (using justices' liberal or conservative ideologies, as measured by newspa-
per editorials at the time of their appointments, to predict substantively liberal and conservative vot-
ing patterns). Other relevant work by Segal and coauthors includes Harold J. Spaeth and Jeffrey A.
Segal, The US. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base:Providing New Insights into the Court, 83 Judica-
ture 228 (2000); Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices, 83 Am Pol Sci Rev 557 (1989).
94 See Segal, et al, 57 J Pol at 815 (cited in note 93).
95 Id.
96 See id at 815 n 4.
97 Seeid at 815.
93 See West, 88 Mich L Rev at 654-58 (cited in note 91) (distinguishing among three types of
conservatives).
99 See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000,48 UCLA L
Rev 1191,1198 (2001) (observing that the justices' voting records from 1994-2000 "reveal that we can
no longer assume that the Left generally sides with speakers and the Right with the government");
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal RealistApproaches to the FirstAmendment, 1990
Duke L J 375,383-84 (discussing an "ideological drift" with respect to First Amendment issues, as
conservatives have become more libertarian in light of the shifting focus of the debate). Another ex-
planation would be that the categorical scheme is inevitably at least somewhat over- and underinclu-
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"conservative" have taken a more civil libertarian approach than the
"liberals" with respect to hate speech," ° campaign advertising,' ' and the
rights of abortion protestors. ' These complications and imperfections
aside, the Segal and Spaeth catalog of substantively conservative posi-
tions has the virtues of being prominent " and relatively sharply defined,
and reasonably well correlated with public perceptions. m Within that
framework, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas were all viewed as conservatives at the time of their
appointment, and all have maintained substantively conservative voting
records.'o
2. Methodological conservatism.
Conservative judicial philosophies also include a methodological
component. But just as the conservative rubric encompasses both sub-
stantive libertarians and substantive social conservatives, methodological
conservatism includes competitive strands. Currently, the most promi-
nent version is "originalism."'' Except where ensconced precedents dic-
tate otherwise, originalists assert that contemporary constitutional issues
should be resolved in accordance with the "original understanding" of
the Constitution's meaning.'" Implicit in originalism is a commitment to
sive, especially insofar as there is an overlap between the categories of "civil rights" and "economic"
cases.
100 For example, in R.A.V v City of St. Paul,505 US 377 (1992), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion invalidating a law prohibiting
only those "fighting words" that vilified particular groups, on the grounds that such a prohibition was
impermissibly viewpoint-based.The other justices concurred in the invalidation, finding that the chal-
lenged ordinance banned speech that did not come within the constitutionally regulable category of
"fighting words," but rejected the view that it would violate the First Amendment to ban racist fight-
ing words but not others. See id at 399-411 (White concurring).
101 For example, in the recent cases of Federal Election Commission v Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee, 533 US 431 (2001), and Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
528 US 377 (2000), Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted to uphold free speech claims that
were rejected by Court majorities, majorities that included all of the justices sometimes classed as
"liberal" -Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
102 In Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703,741-42 (2000), and Madsen v Women's Health Center, Inc,
512 US 753,784-814 (1994), Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas all dissented from majority rulings
that rejected free speech claims in whole or in part.
103 See Segal, et al, 57 J Pol at 813 (cited in note 93) (noting widespread usage among political
scientists).
104 See id at 815.
105 See id at 816 table 2.
106 See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 627-34 (cited in note 33).
107 See, for example, Antonin Scalia,A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 38-
47 (Princeton 1997); ClarenceThomas, Judging,45 U Kan L Rev 1, 6-7 (1996); Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 143-46 (Macmillan 1990).
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"textualism";' constitutional and statutory texts almost always provide
the most reliable guide to the original understanding.'09
Another strand of judicial conservatism treats adherence to
nonoriginalist precedent not so much as exceptional as partly constitu-
tive of the judicial function. 0 Within this approach, a conservative judge
or justice is characterized largely by a Burkean sensibility."' Burkean
conservatives conjoin a reverence for tradition with the embrace of con-
112
straining ideals of judicial role and craft. They eschew theoretical gen-
eralizations and broad constitutional theories'13 and prefer to move in
small steps.' Among modern justices, perhaps the leading exemplar of
Burkean conservatism was the second Justice Harlan."" But Justice
O'Connor frequently casts herself in this tradition,'16 as more occasionally
117 118do Justice Kennedy ' and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In view of the disparate strands of both substantive and methodo-
logical conservatism,"' it would be surprising if a single central linkage
108 See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 627 (cited in note 33).
109 Justice Antonin Scalia, who has argued more prominently for an originalist methodology
than any other justice, see, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 139-41 (cited in note
107), has also defended a strong preference for decision according to sharp, determinate rules. See
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,1187 (1989) (urging that
"the law of rules [ ] be extended as far as the nature of the question allows"). Professor Young dis-
cerns a connection between rule-based decisionmaking and constitutional originalism: both seek to
constrain constitutional decisionmaking by establishing a criterion of correctness external to the val-
ues of the individual judge or justice. See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 640-41 (cited in note 33). Among
the current justices, Justices Scalia and Thomas identify themselves as originalists. See their works
cited in note 107.
110 See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 688-715 (cited in note 33) (explicating a Burkean conservative
judicial philosophy).
III See id at 687-88 (noting that Burkeans believe that no theory can be "entirely satisfactory
when brought into contact with the unruly facts of reality, and that theorizing can therefore only take
us so far").
112 See id at 681; Charles A. Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 NY L Sch L Rev 33,
51(1991).
113 See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 687-88 (cited in note 91).
114 See id at 680-81. Burkeans tend, accordingly, to be what Cass Sunstein caUs judicial "mini-
rmalists," wary of broad claims and especially of overarching theories. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case
at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 3-23 (Harvard 1999) (defining and presenting a
defense of judicial minimalism). But minimalism, as defined by Sunstein, is consistent with either lib-
eral or conservative substantive decisionmaking. See id at 9 (characterizing Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, as well as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, as minimalists). Burkeanism, by contrast, in-
cludes attitudes of respect for tradition that align more consistently with substantive conservatism.
See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 697-712 (cited in note 91).
115 See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 723-24 (cited in note 91).
116 See id at 721-22.
117 See id at 720-21.
118 See Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 443-44 (2000) (Rehnquist) (upholding the
Court's ruling in Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), largely on the basis that its ruling had long
been entrenched).
119 Kathleen Sullivan has traced a partially distinct fault line among judicial conservatives be-
tween those justices who prefer relatively determinate rules and those drawn to standards that re-
quire more case-by-case judgment in application. See Kathleen M.Sullivan, The Supreme Cour4 1991
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held the positions together. Nonetheless, several possible affinities stand
out. First, an originalist methodology may tend to promote substantively
conservative outcomes with respect to many issues." Second, behind the
specific preferences of substantive conservatives may lie a generalized
desire for order and stability; if so, this preference may go hand-in-hand
with a preference either for clear rules established by the Constitution's




Positions involving allocations of governmental power frequently
also carry labels as conservative or liberal. Along this dimension,judicial
conservatism is often measured by support for doctrines that protect the
prerogatives of state and local governments within constitutional federal-
ism'22and that promote a strong, unitary executive branch.' In addition,
conservatives often claim to favor a narrow role for the judiciary, or at
least to disfavor judicial innovation. '2
It is not obvious why support for a strong, unitary executive branch,
or indeed for robust federalism, should count as conservative. But pro-
executive and pro-federalism positions may both grow at least partly
from a distrust of federal legislative power '2a- a view that Congress has
assumed an overweening, potentially dangerous role in the structure of
constitutional government and that countervailing institutions therefore
need to be fortified. Moreover, there are a number of candidates to ex-
plain why pro-federalism positions merit designation as conservative.
One straightforward possibility is that judicial conservatives distinguish
themselves from liberals partly by attaching greater significance to the
values associated with federalism, as described above. Liberals might
care more about substantive outcomes, some or possibly many of which
Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22,122 (1992).
120 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 487,492 (1996) (emphasizing originalists' characteristically conservative substantive agenda).
121 See West, 88 Mich L Rev at 658-62 (cited in note 91).
122 See note 90 and accompanying text.
123 See, for example, Charles A. Fried, Order and Law:Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A
Firsthand Account 151-71 (Simon & Schuster 1991) (defending this view).
124 See Young, 72 NC L Rev at 634-37 (cited in note 91) (discussing the concept of judicial re-
straint as central to judicial conservatism);West, 88 Mich L Rev at 648 (cited in note 91) (asserting
that conservative constitutionalists believe "judges should defer, whenever possible, to the will of leg-
islators").
125 See Printz v United States,521 US 898,922-23 (1997) (invalidating a statute mandating that
state and local officials enforce federal law partly on the ground that the "unity [of the Executive
Branch] would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Con-
gress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to
execute its laws").
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cannot be realized effectively without national mandates.'2 Another pos-
sibility is that pro-federalism doctrines tend to promote substantively
conservative outcomes; on average, state and local institutions may be
more substantively conservative than Congress or the federal courts.'2 A
third, by no means inconsistent, possibility is that an originalist method-
ology points to pro-federalism outcomes in many cases. 2
4. Divisions and tensions revisited.
Although I do not pretend to have provided a comprehensive analy-
sis of judicial conservatism, it seems plain that judicial conservatism is
not a single philosophy, but a family of philosophies. On both substantive
and methodological issues, important divisions exist within the conserva-
tive camp. In many cases, considerations of substantive and methodologi-
cal conservatism will converge to support institutionally conservative,
pro-federalism doctrines. But this will not always be so. For example,
there may be issues-such as the question whether sovereign immunity
should be extended from state to local governments-on which a pro-
federalism outcome would be difficult to reach within a conservative
methodology, whether originalist (because local governments were not
originally understood to possess sovereignty)'2 9 or Burkean (because
long-established precedent denies sovereign status to local govern-
ments).'" There may also be cases in which a pro-federalism doctrinal
structure would retard judicial efforts to achieve substantively conserva-
126 See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Searchfor a Judicially Enforceable Federalism,
83 Minn L Rev 849,922 (1999) (critiquing approaches that "mistake[ ] federalism for a theory of lim-
ited government, when it is in fact a theory of allocating government responsibility," and arguing that
"the national government today concentrates on what it is best suited to handle");Briffault,47 Vand
L Rev at 1304 (cited in note 43) (noting that many of the values of federalism are opposed by "com-
pelling countervalues-widely accepted political norms that call for action at the national level
rather than decentralization").
127 See Ronald I Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" but Missing the
Beat Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 Ind L Rev 11,12 (1998) ("One could reasonably
argue that federalism du jour merely serves as a convenient shill for the policy preferences of the
current members of the Supreme Court"); Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and
the Canon ofAcceptable Arguments, 47 Emory L J 89,121-23 (1998) (arguing that conservatives'
support for federalism doctrines is entirely instrumental and linked to promotion of substantively
conservative outcomes).
128 For critical discussion of the related hypothesis that the Supreme Court consistently at-
tempts to adhere to the original understanding in cases involving constitutional federalism, see notes
383-84 and accompanying text.
129 See Gerald E.Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,93 Harv L Rev 1057,1090-1120 (1980) (de-
scribing eighteenth-century assimilation of cities to private corporations).
130 See, for example, Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356,369
(2001);Alden v Maine,527 US 706,756 (1999); Mount Healthy Board of Education v Doyle,429 US
274,280-81 (1977) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit does not extend to counties or
similar municipal corporations); Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529,530-31 (1890) (holding that
circuit court has jurisdiction over a county because the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits against
a state).
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tive outcomes -for example, if state legislatures or state courts adopted
more liberal positions than their federal counterparts.
II. LINES OF FEDERALISM CASES
The aim of this Part is to provide a rough overview of the Supreme
Court's federalism jurisprudence. As I have noted, the Court's most visi-
ble federalism cases run along three principal lines, which this Part ini-
tially surveys. But a fuller picture of the Court's agenda also requires at-
tention to less noticed doctrines.'3 ' Vitally important to constitutional
federalism are doctrines that limit the scope of state and local authority,
either by defining individual rights or by identifying structural principles
that state and local governments must not transgress. The Court also af-
fects federalism through its interpretation of federal statutes as displac-
ing more or less substantive state law. In addition, the Court interacts
with Congress to produce doctrines prescribing the deference owed by
federal courts to state courts and their judgments.
A. Doctrines Limiting Congress's General Regulatory Powers
As recently as a few years ago, Congress's substantive powers under
Article I appeared virtually unlimited. In cases decided during the late
New Deal era, and largely unquestioned for more than fifty years, the
Court said that Congress could regulate any activity with a substantial ef-
fect on or relation to interstate commerce,n with substantial effects to be
measured, not by looking at particular targets of regulatory enforcement,
but by the cumulative impact of all regulated activities. 33 Subsequent
cases reinforced these formulations,4 which the Court relied on to up-
hold central provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act barring race dis-
crimination by places of public accommodation."
131 See Lopez,514 US at 578 (Kennedy concurring) (noting that "this Court has participated in
maintaining the federal balance through judicial exposition of doctrines such as abstention .... the
doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds,.. the whole jurisprudence of preemption....
and many of the rules governing our habeas jurisprudence").
132 See, for example, Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress may
regulate the consumption of wheat because, though interstate, it has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce); United States v Darby, 312 US 100,119-20 (1941) (upholding the provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by em-
ployees whose wages and hours violate the Acts); National Labor Relations Board vJones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp,301 US 1, 37 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act because labor rela-
tions are activities that have "a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce").
133 See Wickard, 317 US at 127-28.
134 See, for example, Perez v United States, 402 US 146,152-56 (1971) (upholding the Consumer
Credit Protection Act's ban on "extortionate credit transactions" as applied to local activities).
135 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States,379 US 241,261 (1964) (holding that the Civil
Rights Act did not exceed Congress's power to regulate commerce); Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US
294,298 (1964) (same).
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To justices of a conservative bent, a situation in which Congress pos-
sessed virtually unbounded regulatory power was clearly unattractive.
Among other considerations, some of the justices may have believed that
judicial underenforcement of federalism norms had both a submerged
political motivation and a discernible political effect: rightly or wrongly,
Washington, D.C. has acquired a reputation as a seat of liberalism and
elitism, while state and local governments are widely viewed as more
conservative and populist. In 1995, the Court's five conservative justices
took a first step toward altering this situation by invalidating a federal
statute forbidding the possession of guns in school zones in Lopez.3 Yet
the Court's message was uncertain. Although its invalidation of the chal-
lenged statute was undeniably extraordinary, the Court purported not to
overrule any previous decisions.3 7 Nor, equally remarkably, did Lopez al-
ter the entrenched formulations defining Congress's commerce power:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and pro-
tect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress's commerce au-
thority includes the power to regulate those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce,... i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. U
More recently, the Court appeared to stiffen the third prong of the
Lopez test by holding in United States v Morrison'" that Congress ex-
ceeded its authority by enacting a statute imposing penalties for violence
against women.' In explaining its ruling, the 5-4 majority emphasized
that violence against women is not distinctively associated with commer-
cial activity.4' Morrison thus appears to establish that only commercial
activities are subject to federal regulation under the third prong of the
Lopez test.42
Matching the Supreme Court's holdings that limit Congress's gen-
eral regulatory power under the Commerce Clause are decisions enforc-
ing limits on Congress's power to regulate private conduct under Section
136 See Lopez, 514 US at 551.
137 Id at 559-60 (suggesting that possession of a gun in a school zone is not an activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce under even the broadest precedent).
138 Id at 558-59.
139 529 US 598 (2000).
140 Id at 602 (holding that Congress exceeded its authority in providing a federal civil remedy in
the Violence Against Women Act).
141 See id at 612-13 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.").
142 See id at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far ... our cases have upheld Com-
merce Clause regulation of interstate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
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5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Morrison restates the
controversial, but entrenched, rule that Congress's power to "enforce"
the Fourteenth Amendment generally encompasses no authority to regu-
late "private" conduct, as opposed to that of states and their officials.' 3
B. Doctrines Limiting Congress's Power to Regulate State and
Local Governmental Activities
A second line of federalism cases limits Congress's capacity directly
to regulate state and local governments, even with respect to activities
linked to interstate commerce. Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Tran-
sit Authority" furnishes relevant background. Reversing an earlier deci-
sion that survived for less than a decade,'45 Garcia upheld congressional
power to regulate the wages and hours of state and local governmental
employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.6 More than that, Garcia
suggested that it was "unworkable" for the Court to identify state gov-
ernmental functions that were immune from federal regulation;' 7 the
principal if not exclusive protections of state sovereignty, the Court
ruled, lay in the political processes through which national legislation is
enacted.'4 Without directly challenging Garcia's holding, the Rehnquist
Court has chipped away at the decision's broadest implications, and in
doing so has identified several judicially enforceable protections of state
and local governmental autonomy. A 1992 decision, New York v United
States,'19 held that Congress could not single out state legislatures and
compel them to enact legislation." Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor explained this noncommandeering rule as necessary to main-
tain the clear lines of political accountability that healthy federalism re-
quires.'' In Printz v United States,"2 the Court extended New York's non-
commandeering rule from state legislatures to executive officials. Under
Printz, Congress may not require state and local officials to enforce fed-
eral law.'3
Interestingly, the noncommandeering principle as specified in Printz
reaches local as well as state governments,' even though the former do
143 See id at 621.
144 469 US 528 (1985).
145 National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976).
146 See Garcia, 469 US at 555-56.
147 See id at 531,543,546-47.
148 See id at 551-52.
149 505 US 144 (1992).
150 Id at 161.
151 See id at 168-69 ("[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the ac-
countability of both state and federal officials is diminished.").
152 521 US 898 (1997).
153 See id at 933,935.
154 See id at 931 n 15, 935 ("[T]he distinction in our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence be-
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not possess sovereign immunity.' 5 The noncommandeering rule of New
York and Printz does not, however, apply to state courts.L% It is long set-
tled that state courts must entertain federal claims on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis." Nor, as the Court stated in Reno v Condon, does the non-
commandeering principle extend to general regulatory legislation, appli-
cable to private parties as well as governmental bodies, that does not
"require the states to act in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens.'... In that case, the Court thus unanimously upheld the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, which bars state motor vehicle departments,
among others, from disclosing personal information required for a
driver's license."O Nor, finally, has the Court applied the noncomman-
deering principle to congressional action under the Spending Clause.The
Court's 1987 decision in South Dakota v Dole,"' written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, holds that Congress can condition federal financial grants on
the states' performance of functions-including presumably the enact-
ment of legislation-that Congress could not directly command the
states to perform.6
Outside Article I, questions about Congress's power to regulate
state and local governments have also arisen under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress "to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article."'6 The most important
recent case is City of Boerne v Flores,' ' which held that Congress over-
stepped its authority by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), a statute purporting to create broader rights to free exercise
of religion than the Supreme Court had found in the Constitution.' The
central issue in Boerne involved the separation of powers: Did Con-
tween States and municipalities is of no relevance here").
155 See, for example, Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama v Garrett, 965,531 US 356,357
(2001);Alden v Maine, 527 US 706,756 (1999); Mount Healthy Board of Education v Doyle, 429 US
274,280-81 (1977); Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529,530 (1890). For an ingenious effort to
ground some protections of local as well as state governmental autonomy on an analogy between
governments and private organizations whose efforts to promote federal ends could not be con-
scripted without a payment of just compensation, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
Mich L Rev 813 (1998).
156 See Printz, 521 US at 928-29; New York 505 US at 178-79.
157 See, for example, Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356,369 (1990) (holding that state courts may not
discriminate against federal claims); Testa v Katt, 330 US 386,389 (1947) (holding that state courts
may not decline to enforce federal laws).
158 528 US 141 (2000).
159 Id at 151.
160 Id at 143-46.
161 483 US 203 (1987).
162 Id at 211-12.
163 US Const Amend XIV, § 5.
164 521 US 507 (1997).
165 Id at 513-16.
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gress's power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment authorize it to go
further than the Court in defining substantive rights? But the case also
had a federalism dimension. If constitutionally valid, the RFRA would
have mandated greater state and local accommodation of religiously mo-
tivated conduct than the Supreme Court had construed the Free Exer-
cise Clause to require.
In Boerne, the Court held that Congress has no power under Sec-
tion 5 to define constitutional rights binding on state and local govern-
ments; Congress's only authority is to "remedy or prevent unconstitu-
tional actions" as defined by the courts." This is a formulation with po-
tentially significant consequences. Prior decisions had left the scope of
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment cloaked in
some uncertainty, 67but the Court had said explicitly that Section 5 gave
Congress "discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,"Y'6 and it
had suggested that the judicial role in determining appropriateness was
limited to testing the rationality of the connection between legislative
means and ends. 9 Of more tangible significance, the Court had previ-
ously upheld important federal statutes forbidding the use of voting
qualifications and practices that Congress thought likely to be used to
abridge rights on racial grounds.'7 Despite the potential breadth of
Boerne's reach, the Court has not so far applied it to overrule any earlier
decisions.
166 Id at 519.
167 The uncertainty arose partly because the Court's opinion construing Congress's power un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbach v Morgan,384 US 641 (1966),blended a
puzzling mix of rationales. As the Court recognized in Flores, 521 US at 528,"[t]here is language in..
.Katzenbach v Morgan ... which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to en-
act legislation that expands the [substantive] rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
but the decision could also be read to rest on narrower grounds. In the aftermath of Morgan, the
Court splintered and was unable to produce any majority opinion in Oregon v Mitchell,400 US 112,
117-18 (1970) (ruling that Congress had the power to lower the voting age to 18 in federal elections,
but not in state elections). Prior to Boerne, Professor Tribe's influential treatise characterized
Mitchell as "incomprehensible" and apparently for that reason described Morgan, with its perplexing
mix of rationales, as "the leading case." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 342 (Foun-
dation 2d ed 1988).
168 Morgan, 384 US at 651.
169 See id, citing McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
170 See, for example, City of Rome v United States, 446 US 156,160-62 (1980) (upholding under
the Fifteenth Amendment an extension of the Voting Rights Act's requirement that certain jurisdic-
tions obtain advance federal authorization of changes in voting standards, practices, and procedures);
Morgan,384 US at 652 (upholding congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to bar use
of literacy tests to prohibit certain Puerto Rico natives from voting); South Carolina v Katzenbach,
383 US 301,333-34 (1966) (sustaining under the Fifteenth Amendment a suspension on literacy tests
to combat discrimination in voting, even though such tests were not per se unconstitutional under
Lassiter v Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 US 45 (1959)).
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C. Sovereign Immunity and Related Cases
The third prominent line of recent federalism cases involves the
Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity. Within this line, the
Court's boldest step came in 1996, when it held in Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida v Florida" that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the
states' immunity from private suits.'72To reach that result, the 5-4 major-
ity needed to overrule a seven-year-old precedent,n but it did so with
brisk efficiency, bordering on disdain.'74
Significantly, a 1997 decision'7 reaffirmed the vitality of Young,
which held the Eleventh Amendment generally inapplicable to suits
seeking injunctive relief against state officials alleged to have violated
federal law.7 Justice Kennedy, joined on this point only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, characterized the rule of Young as largely discretionary and
dependent on case-by-case balancing.'" But the other pro-federalism
conservatives rejected the effort to "recharacterize[ ] and narrow[ ] much
of our Young jurisprudence,"'7' even though they did, on the facts, recog-
nize a single applicable exception and hold that the state's immunity
barred an action challenging the state's regulatory jurisdiction over a
lake bed and naming state officials as the defendants."'
With the Young distinction between actions seeking injunctions
against state officials and suits seeking damages from state treasuries
thus generally reaffirmed,"O the Court again moved aggressively to pro-
tect the states from damages liability in 1999, when it decided a trilogy of
sovereign immunity cases. Perhaps the most important of the cases,
Alden v Maine, "' expressly broke new ground by holding that Congress
lacks Article I authority to force the states to submit to private suits for
damages in state (as well as federal) court, even when the states have
171 517 US 44 (1996).
172 Id at 72-73.
173 See id at 66, overruling Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co, 491 US 1 (1989).
174 See id at 66 ("The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable precedential value,
largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality.").
175 Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,521 US 261,287-88 (1997) (finding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars a suit against state officers seeking a declaration that submerged lands were out-
side a state's regulatory jurisdiction).
176 209 US at 167-68.
177 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 US at 280 (characterizing application of "the Young fiction,"
that state officials sued for injunctive relief are not protected by a state's sovereign immunity, as "an
exercise in line-drawing" historically conducted pursuant to a "case-by-case" approach).
178 Id at 291 (O'Connor concurring).
179 See id at 296-97.
18o According to Justice O'Connor's apparently controlling formulation, a Young suit against a
state officer is available, because not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, "where a plaintiff alleges
an ongoing violation offederal law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospec-
tive." Id at 294.
181 527 US 706 (1999).
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violated valid federal law.'n A second case, College Savings Bank v Flor-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,' overruled a War-
ren-era precedent and held that just as Congress cannot directly abro-
gate the states' immunity from suit when legislating under Article I, nei-
ther can Congress validly deem that the states "constructively waive[ ]"
their immunity by engaging in congressionally specified activities."'
The third decision gave a starkly narrow construction of Congress's
authority to strip the states of their sovereign immunity when legislating
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court held
in 1976 that Section 5 authorizes Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity,' recent cases demand that abrogating legislation must be
"congruent" with and "proportional" to a congressionally identified pat-
tern of constitutional violations.'4 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu-
cation Expense Board v College Savings Bank,'87 the Court found that
legislation abrogating the states' immunity in suits for patent infringe-
ment-which the government sought to characterize as involving depri-
vations of protected property interests without due process of law-
could not satisfy this test."
Since Florida Prepaid, the Court has continued its effort to rein in
Congress's abrogation power and thus to enhance the protective force of
state sovereign immunity. In Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, for ex-
ample, the justices held that Congress lacks power under Section 5 to
subject the states to suit for money damages under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA").'90 Kimel illustrates the peculiar bite
of the Court's Section 5 cases in the domain of state sovereign immunity.
Even in its application to state and local governments, the ADEA is a
valid exercise of Congress's regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause.'91 The significance of Kimel thus involves suability for damages,
not the states' obligation-potentially enforceable through suits for in-
junctions -to obey the federal statute.
182 Id at 712.
183 527 US 666 (1999).
184 Id at 679-80, overruling Parden v Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department,
377 US 184 (1964).
185 Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445,456 (1976).
186 The language comes from Flores, 521 US at 519-20.
187 527 US 627 (1999).
188 Id at 639-48.
189 528 US 62 (2000).
190 Id at 67. Following precisely the same line of reasoning, the Court ruled even more recently
that the states retain their sovereign immunity in suits alleging violations of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act. See Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356,360 (2001).
191 See Kimel, 528 US at 78 (noting that the Court had previously upheld Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause to subject the states to the ADEA in EEOC v Wyoming, 460 US 226,
243 (1983)).
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When the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity cases are compared
with those in the other two prominent federalism lines, two features
stand out. The first is the relative boldness of the sovereign immunity de-
cisions, as signified by the Court's brash willingness to overrule prior
cases and reformulate doctrinal tests. In addition, even when not overrul-
ing cases, the Court, as in Alden, has not hesitated to define broad cate-
gorical limits on congressional power.
The second striking feature of the sovereign immunity cases is their
apparent relative inefficacy as devices for protecting federalism. "Sover-
eign immunity" has consequence only in cases in which the states are not
in fact "sovereign" in any robust sense; the question of suability arises
because state power is limited either by the federal Constitution or by
binding federal law. Nor are the states actually "immune" from suit in a
significant practical sense. Nearly without exception, state officials can be
sued for prospective injunctive relief, and they can often be sued for
damages in their individual capacities. Another loophole, which the
Court itself recently emphasized, is that the states can be sued directly by
the United States.' And, again, local governments remain wholly beyond
sovereign immunity's protections.'9
D. Constitutional Doctrines That Directly Limit State and Local
Governmental Authority
Doctrines that define constitutional rights limit the discretionary au-
thority of state and local governments.'9 The Supreme Court's substan-
tive doctrines are too numerous to permit a brief summary,", and I shall
not assay a lengthy review. Suffice it to observe that in recent years the
Court has loosened some restraints on state and local governments-
under the Establishment Clause,'" for example-while stiffening others.
For instance, the Court has erected high barriers for state and local gov-
ernments that wish to implement affirmative action programs,' and it
192 See Alden, 527 US at 755,759-60.
193 See Garrett, 531 US at 369; Alden, 527 US at 756; Mount Healthy Board of Education v
Doyle, 429 US 274,280-81 (1977); Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529,530 (1890).
194 See DanielA. Farber, Pledging a NewAllegiance:An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Fed-
eralism,75 Notre Dame L Rev 1133,1140 (2000) ("The Court's interest in states' rights ends at the
point where its commitment to individual rights begins.").
195 A full review could not stop with provisions defining substantive rights, but would also need
to include doctrines involving the separation of powers, which may protect federalism by restraining
federal lawmaking. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard ofFederalism, 79 Tex
L Rev 1321,1325 (2001) (explaining the Court's separation of powers decisions and suggesting that
many of these decisions also safeguard federalism).
196 See,for example, Mitchell v Helms,530 US 793,801,829-30 (2000) (upholding a program in-
volving the loaning, on a nondiscriminatory basis, of secular educational materials to religious
schools).
197 See, for example, Richmond vJ.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469,505,508 (1989) (invalidating an
affirmative action program as not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest).
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has toughened judicial scrutiny of governmental action under the Tak-
ings Clause. '8
Also important to federalism are constitutional doctrines that iden-
tify structural limits on state and local authority. Federalism implies that
states and localities must be able to afford some preferences to citizens-
such as free or highly subsidized public education-that they do not pro-. • • 199
vide to noncitizens. Equally plainly, however, the Constitution reflects a
competing principle of unitary nationhood. This principle finds embodi-
ment in the Privileges and Immunities Clause,' which forbids state dis-
crimination against out-of-staters in matters involving "fundamental"
rights, except when "non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil
at which [a] statute is aimed."2n More controversially, the Supreme Court
has also construed the Commerce Clause, which is framed as an affirma-
tive grant of power to Congress, as including an implied "negative" di-
mension that forbids states and municipalities to enact legislation unduly
restricting interstate commerce.
In its central dimension, negative or "dormant" Commerce Clause
doctrine forbids states and localities to adopt tax or regulatory structures
that discriminate against interstate commerce.2 But the Court has also
held that when nondiscriminatory statutes impose an "incidental" burden
on commerce, they too may be invalidated if the local benefits are insuf-
ficiently substantial or "could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities."
It is easy to imagine that a Supreme Court committed to revitalizing
constitutional federalism might adopt a revisionist stance toward dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine. " The doctrine draws little support
198 See, for example, Dolan v Tigard, 512 US 374,383-86 (1994) (finding that a zoning grant
made conditional on a petitioner's allocation of a portion of land to public use is a taking); Lucas v
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003,1014-15,1031-32 (1992) (holding that a regulatory
statute depriving land of all economic value constitutes a taking).
199 See, for example, Martinez v Bynum, 461 US 321,328 (1983) (finding that a "bona fide resi-
dence requirement ... with respect to attendance in public free schools does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause" nor "penalize the constitutional right of interstate travel").
200 See US Const Art IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
201 Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385,398 (1948).
202 See, for example, West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy, 512 US 186,193 n 9 (1994) (explaining
the rationale for the negative dimension).
203 See, for example, Fulton Corp v Faulkner,516 US 325,346 (1996) (invalidating a discrimina-
tory tax); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc v Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 US 93,
108 (1994) (invalidating a surcharge imposed on other states for the disposal of waste); Wyoming v
Oklahoma, 502 US 437,454-55 (1992) (finding unconstitutional a requirement that power plants use
in-state fuel sources).
204 Pike v Bruce Church, Inc, 397 US 137,142 (1970).
205 See, for example, Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc v Town of Harrison,520 US 564,611-12
(1997) (Thomas dissenting) (protesting that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine "undermines
the delicate balance in what we have termed 'Our Federalism'), quoting Younger v Harris, 401 US
37,44 (1971); Martin H. Redish and Shane Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
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from the text of the Commerce Clause, which is framed as a grant of
congressional authority, not a limit on state power.2 Evidence concern-
ing the original understanding provides little or no support. 2 And the
Court's "balancing" methodology in cases involving "incidental" burdens
has drawn scornful protests from Justices Scalia and Thomas.m Perhaps
most important, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine directly impedes
efforts by state and local governments to promote distinctively local
ends.tm Nonetheless, the Court persists in the traditional approach.
Indeed, a 1994 case, West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy,'21 broke new
ground by invalidating a scheme of state subsidies for its domestic dairy
industry." In West Lynn Creamery itself the Court emphasized that the
constitutional difficulty arose from the conjoint operation of the subsi-
dies and a special tax on sales of milk that was used to fund the subsi-
dies.1 All milk was taxed equally, but because only Massachusetts farm-
ers received subsidies, they were advantaged in competition with out-of-
staters in nearly the same way that a discriminatory tax would have
benefited them. 3 The broader implications of West Lynn Creamery are
uncertain, but as Professor Tribe has noted, the uncertainty itself is new.214
Before West Lynn Creamery, the constitutionality of state subsidies for
in-state industries was largely unquestioned. "After West Lynn Creamery,
no state action... that has the effect of benefiting in-state interests at the
expense of out-of-state interests is clearly immune from scrutiny under
the dormant Commerce Clause. 1 5
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 Duke L J569,573 (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine "undermines[ ] the Constitution's carefully established textual structure for allocating power
between federal and state sovereigns").
2 See, for example, Oklahoma Tax Commission v Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 US 175,200 (1995)
(Scalia concurring); Redish and Nugent, 1987 Duke L J at 571,573 (cited in note 205) (noting the ab-
sence of the dormant Commerce Clause in the text of the Constitution and arguing that the Com-
merce Clause is best seen as empowering Congress rather than hamstringing the states).
20 See Redish and Nugent, 1987 Duke LJ at 585-88 (cited in note 205) ("In any event we be-
lieve that historical evidence provides no firm support for the dormant commerce clause's exis-
tence.").
203 Seefor example, Camps NewfoundlOwatonna,520 US at 618-20 (Thomas dissenting) (argu-
ing that the "balancing" methodology invites judgments based upon policy rather than text);Bendix
Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises, Inc, 486 US 888,897-98 (1988) (Scalia concurring) (stating
that the balancing test is "like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy").
29 But see Shapiro, Federalism at 74 n 67 (cited in note 39) (arguing that dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine strengthens federalism by "protecting state interests against unfair treatment by
other states").
210 512 US 186 (1994).
211 Id at 194.
212 See id at 194-95,199-200.
213 See id at 194.
214 See Laurence H.TribeAmerican Constitutional Law § 6-23 at 1150 (Foundation 3d ed2000).
215 Id.
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
E. Protection of Federalism through Interpretation of Substantive
Regulatory Statutes
As Justice Breyer recently observed:
[T]he true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional
effort to trim Congress'[s] commerce power at its edges ... or to
protect a state treasury from a private damage action ... but rather
in those many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of
216technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.
Through its interpretation of federal statutes, the Supreme Court
has myriad opportunities to promote federalism. The Court's cases and
doctrines present a study in diversity. One important doctrine addresses
federal "preemption" of state law." In cases of actual conflict between
state and federal commands, federal law indisputably prevails under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI.21 The recurring question is whether
Congress, although possessed of power to displace state rules, has mani-
fested its intent to do so.
So far as I am aware, no commentator has affirmatively linked the
Supreme Court's preemption cases to its federalism agenda.) The expla-
nation resides partly in preemption doctrine's entrenched tenets. The
doctrine has long expressed a pro-federalism presumption against infer-
ring preemption, especially in areas of traditional state regulation.m But
part of the explanation, too, involves the unwillingness of the Rehnquist
Court consistently to enforce a robust presumption against preemption.
Over the decade since Clarence Thomas joined the Court and produced
the current pro-federalism five-member majority, the Court has decided
thirty-five preemption cases and found state statutes or causes of action
to be preempted, either in whole or in part, in twenty-two. M
Indeed, during the Court's 1999 and 2000 Terms, the Court decided seven
216 Egelhoffv Egelhoff, 121 S Ct 1322,1335 (2001) (Breyer dissenting).
217 On the connection between preemption doctrine and constitutional federalism, consider S.
Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 BU L Rev 685 (1991).
218 US Const Art VI, § 2.
219 See Young, 1999 S Ct Rev at 3-4 (cited in note 17) (noting the importance of preemption
cases to constitutional federalism, but discussing a case in which the Court had found that federal law
preempted state law).
220 See, for example, Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218,230 (1947) ("[I]n a field which
the States have traditionally occupied ... we start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.").
221 These figures come from a Westlaw search of all cases from the 1991 Term onwards for
which the case syllabus included any derivative of the word "preemption."This search yielded forty-
five cases, ten of which did not involve issues involving federal preemption of state statutes or causes
of action. Among the remaining thirty-five cases, the Court found the challenged statute or cause of
action to be preempted in sixteen cases. In six cases, some statutes or causes of action were deemed
to be preempted, while others were not. The Court rejected preemption claims in thirteen cases.
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preemption cases and held that federal law preempted state law in all of
them.2
Another set of interpretive questions involves the application of
federal statutes to state and local governments. When the question is
whether a federal statute regulates the states, the Court employs a "clear
statement" requirement: it will not construe regulatory legislation as en-
compassing the states or attempting to abrogate their immunity unless
Congress makes its intent "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."'3
So far, the Court has not applied the clear statement rule to give
similar protection to local governments. The Court has, however, devel-
oped a variety of other doctrines to protect local treasuries from private
suits for damages. Perhaps the most important involve 42 USC § 1983,
("Section 1983") which creates a cause of action against any "person"
who "under color" of state law or custom violates or causes the violation
of federal rights. A 1978 Supreme Court decision, Monell v Department
of Social Servicesm holds that local governments-unlike states-are su-
able "persons."2' Although the Court has not moved to reconsider Mo-
nell, its subsequent decisions establishing standards of municipal liability
make it exceedingly difficult to prove that local governments are causally
responsible, and thus directly liable, for wrongs committed by their offi-
cials.2'
2 See Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly, 121 S Ct 2404,2419 (2001) (finding preemption of loca-
tion restrictions on cigarette advertising under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act);
Egelhoff, 121 S Ct at 1325-26 (holding that a state statute governing the rights of divorced spouses
under provisions made prior to the divorce was preempted by the Federal Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act); Buckman Co v Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 121 S Ct 1012,1015 (2001) (ruling.
that state law claims that a manufacturer committed fraud on the federal Food and Drug Administra-
tion were preempted by federal law); Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363,366
(2000) (finding federal preemption of a state law barring state entities from buying goods or services
from companies doing business with Burma); Geier v American Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861,881
(2000) (determining that a state law tort action posed an obstacle to the purposes ofthe Federal Mo-
tor Vehicle Safety Act and was therefore preempted); Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Shanklin, 529
US 344,347 (2000) (concluding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act and its implementing regula-
tions preempted state tort claims concerning a railroad's failure to maintain adequate warning de-
vices at crossings). Consider United States v Locke,529 US 89 (2000) (finding some state oil spill pre-
vention regulations preempted by the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act and remanding for a
decision on others).
223 Gregory vAshcroft,501 US 452,460-61(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting
Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234,242 (1985).
224 436 US 658 (1978).
= Id at 663.
226 See, for example, McMillian v Monroe County, 520 US 781,786 (1997) (reaffirming that
state, rather than federal, law determines who is a policymaking official capable of establishing poli-
cies for which a county or municipality is causally responsible); Board of County Commissioners v
Brown,520 US 397,400,415 (1997) (ruling that in the absence of a claim that a policymaking official
violated federal law or directed a violation of federal rights, municipal liability requires proof of de-
liberate indifference by policymaking officials to the risk of the particular injury suffered by the
plaintiff).These and other relevant Supreme Court cases implement the basic holding of Monell,436
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The Court has also developed subconstitutional doctrines that pro-
tect local governments, and states too, against vicarious liability for dam-
ages awards against their officers and employees. Regardless of whether
a state or local government can be sued directly, state and local officials
who violate federal rights can typically be sued for damages under Sec-
tion 1983 in their "individual" capacities.M Although this styling signals
that relief is wanted from the officials' personal resources, not the public
treasury,m most state and local governments apparently indemnify their
employees, at least most of the time.m In "officer suits" under Section
1983, the Supreme Court has developed elaborate doctrines of official
immunity. Officials performing a few functions enjoy "absolute immu-
nity" from damages liability.M More typically, officials possess "qualified
immunity," which shields them from damages claims unless they violated
"clearly established" federal rightsni
In shaping official immunity doctrines, the Court has built on com-
mon law foundations. It assumes that Congress, when enacting Section
1983, intended to retain the immunities prevailing at common law.23 Ac-
US at 663, that although counties and municipalities are suable "persons" under Section 1983, they
cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory, id at 691, but are only liable when tortious acts oc-
cur in the execution of a governmental body's policy or custom, id at 694. In light of decisions such as
these, John Jeffries, 84 Va L Rev at 58 (cited in note 35), concludes that the Supreme Court "majority
seems eager to take any opportunity to defeat" municipal liability. See also Brian J. Serf, Turning Sec-
tion 1983"s Protection of Civil Rights into an Attractive Nuisance: Extra-Textual Barriers to Municipal
Liability under Monell, 35 Ga L Rev 881,902 (2001) (asserting that "the Court repeatedly strives to
read § 1983 to foreclose a remedy"); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under Section 1983: Mu-
nicipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 Cornell L Rev 1503,1505-06 (1999) (emphasizing the
extent to which limitations on municipal liability make it difficult to vindicate federal rights).
227 See Hafer v Melo,502 US 21,31 (1991) (allowing state officials to be sued for damages under
Section 1983 for actions undertaken in their individual, but not official, capacities); Jeffries, 84 Va L
Rev at 49-50,59 (cited in note 35).
2n See Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159,165-68 (1985) (discussing the difference between per-
sonal capacity and official capacity suits).
229 See Meltzer,75 Notre Dame L Rev at 1018-20 (cited in note 32) (reporting that indemnifica-
tion is "generally thought to be widespread"); Jeffries, 84 Va L Rev at 50 (cited in note 35). But see
Peter H. Schuck, Suing the Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 85 (Yale 1983) (de-
scribing indemnification of state and local officials sued under Section 1983 as "neither certain nor
universal"). It appears that no good empirical study has been done to date. Jeffries,84 Va L Rev at 50
& n 16 (cited in note 35), for example, candidly acknowledges that "the best evidence" for his conclu-
sion that indemnification is "pervasive[ ] and dependabl[e]" comes from his "personal experience."
At law enforcement seminars at which he regularly lectures, Jeffries asks "whether the officers there
assembled know personally of any case where an officer sued under § 1983 was not defended and in-
demnified by his or her agency," and "[t]he uniform answer is 'no."' Id.
230 See, for example, Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800,807-08 (1982) (discussing absolute immu-
nity and noting that it extends to judges in their judicial capacity and legislators in their legislative
capacity); Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409,430 (1976) (recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity
when a prosecutor is acting as an advocate rather than an investigator or an administrator).
231 See Harlow, 457 US at 818.
232 See Tower v Glover,467 US 914,920 (1984) ("If an official was accorded immunity from tort
actions at common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871, the Court next considers
whether § 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same immunity in
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cordingly, to determine the immunity to which an official is entitled, the
Court looks first to the common law.3 At least sometimes, however, the
Court has appealed directly to policy concerns. It did so most notably in
Harlow v Fitzgerald,2m the case framing the currently applicable qualified
immunity standard. Reasoning that the previously formulated rule had
permitted too many harassing and vexatious lawsuits, Harlow adjusted
the framework to afford officials enhanced protection.2 '
F. Doctrines of Judicial Federalism
Federal judicial jurisdiction frequently overlaps state judicial juris-
diction.2 3' Questions thus arise about whether and when federal courts
should await the outcome of state court processes or defer to their judg-
ments. In the first instance, responsibility to answer these questions re-
sides in Congress. Nonetheless, federal courts have long assumed what
David Shapiro terms a "principled discretion" in "fine tuning" open-
ended jurisdictional grants. Exercising its discretion, the Supreme Court
has historically weighed interests of comity and federalism in limiting
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, in restricting federal judicial interfer-
ence with pending state court proceedings, and in construing its own ju-
risdiction to review state court judgments.23 9 Interestingly, however, these
doctrines have not figured in the current Court's federalism agenda as
sites of judicially driven, pro-federalism reforms.
With respect to habeas corpus, at least since 1996, the Court has
taken a back seat to Congress. Federal habeas review of state convictions
reached its zenith under the Warren Court. The Burger Court then im-
plemented significant cutbacks, and the Rehnquist Court followed with
more restrictions.2' 0 Of particular importance was Teague v Lane,24' de-
cided in 1989, which held that federal courts could not grant habeas relief
based on "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure" the recogni-
tion and application of which were "not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final."24 2 It is unclear how
§ 1983 actions.").
233 See id.
234 457 US 800 (1982).
235 Id at 814-18.
236 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1187 (Foundation 4th ed 1996).
237 David L. Shapiro,Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 NYU L Rev 543,578 (1985).
238 Id at 574.
239 See Shapiro, Federalism at 1-3 (cited in note 39) (identifying doctrines sensitive to federal-
ism concerns).
240 For a critical review of restrictions on habeas jurisdiction imposed between 1976 and 1995,
see Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 Cal L Rev 485
(1995).
241 489 US 288 (1989).
242 Id at 301.The rationale depended heavily on concerns of federalism:
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much further the Court might have gone in restricting federal habeas re-
view if left on its own.2 ' Congress substantially mooted the question by
enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."
Among its myriad cutbacks on federal habeas jurisdiction, the 1996 Act
precludes relief on any claim "adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States."2 5 In the wake of Congress's action, a host of interpretive
questions confronts the Court, but there can be little felt need for Court-
initiated reform to protect federalism.
Neither has the current Court deployed so-called abstention doc-
trines to expand protections of federalism beyond previous bounds. The
prevailing regime generally took shape during the 1970s and 1980s, when
the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts invoked the rubric "Our Federal-
ism" to justify doctrines forbidding federal injunctions against state ju-
dicial and administrative proceedings. The germinal case was Younger v
Harris,' 4which on its facts merely applied the venerable maxim that eq-
uity will not enjoin a pending criminal prosecution.m But Younger
marked only the beginning. In a series of decisions that seemed at the
The "costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional
law on habeas corpus ... generally far outweigh the benefits of this application."... [T]he appli-
cation of new rules to cases on collateral review ... continually forces the States to marshal re-
sources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-
existing constitutional standards. Furthermore,..." [s]tate courts are understandably frustrated
when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, dur-
ing a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands."
Id at 310 (internal citations omitted).
243 Teague raised many questions, especially about the definition of "new rules" not retroac-
tively applicable on habeas. Perhaps more significantly, it opened new avenues for legal argument. In
particular, some of its language suggested the controlling significance of what a reasonable judge, at
the time of a criminal trial and appeal, would necessarily have understood the law to be.This strand
in Teague's analysis helped license the argument that federal habeas relief should issue only when a
state court's decision of a constitutional issue was not "reasonable" in light of preexisting federal au-
thority. Interestingly, the Court bypassed an invitation to move in this direction in Wright v West,505
US 277 (1992). In Wright, Justice Thomas's plurality opinion sympatheticay summarized the state's
argument that federal habeas courts should defer to reasonable state court decisions of mixed ques-
tions of law and fact, id at 285-95, but ultimately dismissed the claim on the merits,id at 295. Signifi-
cantly, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, the two conservative justices who most frequently display a
Burkean methodological disposition, both distanced themselves from the plurality's dicta and main-
tained that Teague established a nonretroactivity rule, not a more general principle of deference. See
id at 297-306 (O'Connor concurring); id at 306-10 (Kennedy concurring).
244 Pub L No 104-132,110 Stat 1214, codified in scattered sections of the United States Code.
245 28 USC § 2254(d)(1) (1994 & Supp 1998).
246 The label comes from Younger v Harris, 401 US 37,44 (1971).
247 401 US 37 (1971).
248 Id at 53 ("[W]e hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having upset
the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief
against state criminal prosecutions.").
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time to have no end, the Court held that Younger's policies of equity,
comity, and federalism extended from criminal cases to civil enforcement
proceedings brought by the state, 9 to suits between private parties
involving the coercive enforcement of important state interests, 2 and to
state administrative proceedings of a judicial nature. 2 '
By the end of the 1980s, however, the Court appeared to have lost
interest in significant further expansions. The trend-breaking decision
came in 1989 in New Orleans Public Service, Inc v Council of the City of
New Orleans ("NOPS')." In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court
ruled that a federal court should not abstain from deciding a suit for in-
junctive and declaratory relief due to the pendency of a state-initiated
declaratory judgment action in state court.2 3 A declaratory judgment suit,
the Court held, was not the type of proceeding to which Younger applies,
apparently because it did not seek a coercive enforcement of state law.2
The Court also rebuffed abstention arguments in Quackenbush vAllstate
Insurance Co,2" which denied the applicability of Younger policies to a
suit for damages.2 Quackenbush reasoned that "federal courts have the
power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only
where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary."27
A final doctrine of judicial federalism, the so-called adequate and
independent state ground doctrine,2" also merits notice. The Supreme
249 See, for example, Trainor v Hemandez,431 US 434,444 (1977) (applying Younger to an ac-
tion to recover welfare payments allegedly obtained by fraud); Huffman v Pursue, Ltd, 420 US 592,
594-95 (1975) (applying the Younger doctrine to a state civil action to "abate" the showing of ob-
scene movies).
250 See, for example, Pennzoil Co v Texaco, Inc, 481 US 1,10-11 (1987) (finding that Younger
barred a federal injunction against enforcement of rights arising from a state court judgment while
appeal of that judgment was pending in state court);Juidice v Vail,430 US 327,329-30 (1977) (apply-
ing Younger to civil contempt proceedings arising from private litigation).
251 See, for example, Ohio Civil Rights Commission v Dayton Christian Schoo4, Inc,477 US 619,
621-22 (1986) (applying Younger to administrative proceedings before a state civil rights commis-
sion); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v Garden State Bar Association, 457 US 423,425 (1982)
(applying Younger to bar discipline proceedings).
252 491 US 350 (1989).
253 Id at 367-68.
254 See id at 368:
[I]t has never been suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state judicial
proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action [and not involving a claim to a coercive en-
forcement remedy]. Such a broad abstention requirement would make a mockery of the rule
that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference
to the States.
255 517 US 706 (1996).
256 Id at 731.
257 Id. Curiously, the Court acknowledged that a federal court could "stay" or "postpone" adju-
dication of a damages action pending adjudication of a parallel action in state court, even though the
practical effect-due to the application of claim and issue preclusion doctrines-would be virtually
identical to that of a dismissal or remand. Id at 721.
258 See Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 524-28 (cited in note 236) (introducing
and explicating the doctrine).
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Court has long held that it lacks jurisdiction to review a state court's de-
cision concerning federal law when the state court's judgment is sup-
ported by an "adequate and independent" state ground-a state law
basis for decision that would mandate the same ultimate result, irrespec-
tive of how the Supreme Court might resolve any federal issue.2° Al-
though largely unchallenged as a matter of principle, the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine is of course not self-applying. Diffi-
cult questions sometimes arise about whether a state court's decision of a
state law issue is independent of, rather than controlled by, its under-
standing of federal law.n' Prior to 1983, the Court's usual (though not in-
variable) practice in doubtful cases was to ask state courts to clarify the
basis for their rulings.= In Michigan v Long,m the Burger Court adopted
a new approach. In ambiguous cases, the Court now presumes that state
grounds of decision are not independent of federal grounds.2
Long's effect is to increase the incidence of Supreme Court review
and reversal of decisions by states' highest courts. Reversion to the prior
practice would spare state courts the indignity of being reversed on fed-
eral issues that may not determine ultimate results.2 Yet the Court's pro-
federalism justices have shown no disposition to reconsider Long, even
in the midst of a purported federalism revolution.2
III. EXPLAINING THE MIXED PICTURE
The lines of federalism cases discussed in Part II present a mixed
picture that cries out for explanation. First, there are some doctrinal ar-
259 Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032,1037-38 (1983). See also Fox Film Corp v Muller,296 US 207,
210 (1935).
260 Fox Film, 296 US at 210.
261 See Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 528-64 (cited in note 236) (critically re-
viewing relevant Supreme Court cases).
262 See, for example, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Jerome, 434 US 241,241-42 (1978) (re-
manding to state court for clarification of the record); Herb v Pitcairn, 324 US, 117,127-28 (1945)
(remanding to state court for an explanation of the basis for its decision); Minnesota v National Tea
Co, 309 US 551,557 (1940) ("Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the
elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions" of state courts.). Other approaches
sometimes taken by the Court-including dismissal and independent examination of state law by the
Court itself-are catalogued in Long, 463 US at 1038-40.
263 463 US 1032 (1983).
264 Id at 1040-41.
265 In Long, the Court asserted that its approach displayed "respect for state courts;' id at 1040,
by "avoid[ing] the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their deci-
sions to the satisfaction of [the] Court," id at 1041. But as Justice Jackson noted nearly forty years
earlier, it is more "consistent with the respect due to the highest courts of states of the Union that
they be asked rather than told what they have intended. If this imposes an unwelcome burden it
should be mitigated by the knowledge that it is to protect their jurisdiction from unwitting interfer-
ence." Herb, 324 US at 128 (1945).
266 See Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 540-43 (cited in note 236) (tracing subse-
quent developments).
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eas that seem, at least at first blush, to be surprisingly unaffected by the
federalism revival or revolution that is burgeoning in other fields. Why,
for example, has the Court bypassed opportunities to promote federal-
ism through doctrines involving the dormant Commerce Clause and fed-
eral preemption? Why has it not insisted on greater deference to state
courts under doctrines governing judicial federalism? Second, the Court
has proceeded with relative caution in two of the lines of cases at the
heart of its federalism agenda-those involving Congress's general regu-
latory powers and its powers directly to regulate the states under the
Commerce Clause. Why? Third, the Court has assumed a more aggres-
sive posture in expanding state sovereign immunity. Why has the Court
done so, despite that doctrine's apparent crudeness as a tool for promot-
ing constitutional federalism?
In response to these and related questions, this Part draws three
main conclusions. First, the Court's most pro-federalism justices are also
substantively conservative, and when substantive conservatism conflicts
with federalism values, substantive conservatism frequently prevails.
Second, even in areas central to the Court's federalism agenda, consid-
erations associated with path dependence often exert constraining influ-
ence. Third, finding themselves blocked or divided in some areas, the
Court's five most pro-federalism justices have made the most of other
opportunities. At least in part, the Court's heavy reliance on sovereignimmunity reflects contingency and opportunism within a multifaceted ef-
fort to protect state and local governments from damages liability.
A. Quiet Fronts in the Federalism Revival
As suggested in Part II, there are areas in which the Supreme Court
has done notably little to advance federalism. In several, it is hard not to
detect the influence of the pro-federalism justices' methodological, and
especially their substantive, conservatism.27
267 Studies that have drawn similar conclusions include Frank B. Cross, Realism about Federal-
ism,74 NYU L Rev 1304,1306 (1999) (arguing that purportedly pro-federalism judges merely use the
doctrine as a means of promoting their own ideological agendas); Wells, 47 Emory L J at 121-25
(cited in note 127) (observing that federalism doctrine is influenced by political views);Emerson H.
Tiller, Putting Politics into the Positive Theory of Federalism:A Comment on Bednar & Eskridge, 68 S
Cal L Rev 1493,1496-1501 (1995) (suggesting that the political climate at a given time determines
whether judges will support federal claims);William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1355,1396 (1994)
(charting the relationship between ideologies and federalism in Commerce Clause cases); Michael
Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal Courts, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 499,
499 (1989) ("[S]ubstantive factors exert a powerful and often unrecognized influence over the resolu-
tion of jurisdictional issues").
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1. Constitutional doctrines affecting state and local
governments' regulatory authority.
As noted earlier, it would be a hopeless task to attempt to chart the
influence of federalism values on the Supreme Court's efforts to define
individual rights. Surely, however, it escapes no one's notice that the jus-
tices who purport to be most solicitous of democracy and federalism in
some areas insist on expanding controversial definitions of constitutional
rights in others.' Doctrinal prohibitions against affirmative action6 and
"regulatory" takings of private property2°-which the Court's conserva-
tive justices support-limit the autonomy of state and local governments
fully as much as would bars against various kinds of support for religion,
which the same justices have tended to relax." ' Nor can the Court's af-
firmative action and takings decisions be explained as dictated by the
original understanding. Throughout the period surrounding the proposal
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress enacted stat-
utes specifically providing benefits for "colored" persons;2 in light of
these statutes, "those who profess fealty to the 'original understanding'..
.cannot categorically condemn color-based distribution of governmental
benefits."m Similarly, the Court has departed from the original under-
standing in concluding that governmental regulation of permissible land
uses can constitute a "taking" in the absence of any physical seizure.2'
More interesting, in some ways, is the current conservative Court's
failure to extend its federalism agenda to the dormant Commerce
Clause. Considerations of stare decisis might make it difficult for the
Court simply to renounce dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Nonethe-
less, a Court minded to pare back restrictions as a means of empowering
state and local governments could easily do so-for example, by estab-
lishing that only expressly discriminatory taxes and tariff-like devices are
forbidden. 5 Among the most plausible explanations for the Court's fail-
268 See, for example, Cross, 74 NYU L Rev at 1309-10 (cited in note 267) (citing similar evi-
dence as establishing that the justices invoke federalism doctrines "selectively to promote policy ob-
jectives").
269 See, for example, Richmond v JA. Croson Co, 488 US 469,493,507-08 (1989).
270 See, for example, Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374,396 (1994); Lucas v South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 US 1003,1030-32 (1992).
271 See, for example, Mitchell v Helms,530 US 793,801 (2000) (upholding a program involving
the loaning, on a nondiscriminatory basis, of secular educational materials to religious schools).
272 See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L J 427,430-32 (1997).
273 Id at 431-32.
274 See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings and "Judicial Supremacy", 51 Ala L Rev 949,955
(2000) (noting that "regulatory takings doctrine is very vague and rests on no textual or historical
support"); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Politi-
cal Process, 95 Colum L Rev 782,791 (1995) (stating that the original understanding of the Takings
Clause was that it "only mandated compensation when the government physically took property").
275 See West Lynn Creamery,512 US at 210 (Scalia concurring) (rejecting any extension of dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, but accepting "on stare decisis grounds" enforcement of prohibi-
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ure to do so, despite the frequent dissenting protests of Justices Scalia
andThomas, 6 s that the substantive conservatism of Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy draws them to view the Commerce Clause as embodying
antiregulatory, procompetitive ideals.m Surely rival explanations rooted
in stare decisis and path dependence cannot explain their joining of Jus-
tice Stevens's opinion in West Lynn Creamery, which can be read to sig-
nal an expansion of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to threaten tra-
ditional state subsidies of domestic industries.m
2. Protection of federalism through interpretation of substantive
regulatory statutes.
Whereas one might expect pro-federalism Justices to disfavor claims
of federal preemption of state law, substantive conservatism may help to
explain why the Court has so frequently upheld preemption claims in re-
cent years. Because federal preemption eliminates state regulatory bur-
dens, preemption rulings have a tendency-welcome to substantive con-
servatives-to minimize the regulatory requirements to which businesses
are subject.27 As noted above, the Court held that state law was pre-
empted in every one of its seven preemption cases during the 1999 and
tions"(1) against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a
state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court").
276 See, for example, Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc v Harrison, 520 US 564,609-20 (1997)
(Thomasjoined by Scalia, dissenting);BendixAutolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc, 486 US 888,
897-98 (1988) (Scalia concurring).
277 Both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have joined important recent opinions expressing this
philosophy. See, for example, Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, 520 US at 575-88 (noting that the dor-
mant Commerce Clause is meant to prevent economic protectionism); West Lynn Creamery, Inc v
Healy, 512 US 186,205-07 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting H.P. Hood & Sons; Inc
v DuMond, 336 US 525,539 (1949):
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall
be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition
from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
278 See notes 210-15 and accompanying text. Another possible explanation, also difficult to
square with West Lynn Creamery, would be that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy subscribe to a the-
ory of federalism under which the states are permitted to benefit their citizens, but should not be
able to impose the costs of their doing so on other states. For a general discussion, see Jenna Bednar
and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path".A Theory of Judicial Enforce-
ment of Federalism, 68 S Cal L Rev 1447 (1995) (seeking to explain the Court's decisions in federal-
ism cases on this basis).
279 See Segal and Spaeth, Supreme Court at 305 (cited in note 92) (characterizing pro-business
positions in cases challenging regulatory governmental regulations as "conservative").See also Cross,
74 NYU L Rev at 1310 (cited in note 267) (" [Conservative justices blithely strike down state legisla-
tive regulation of business in preemption cases, with scarcely a nod to the interests of federalism.");
Hoke, 71 BU L Rev at 691 (cited in note 217) (noting that business interests are leaders in seeking
rulings of preemption).
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2000 Terms.=M Four of the Court's five most conservative, generally pro-
federalism justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy-found federal preemption in each instance, and
Justice Thomas agreed in every case but one. In one of the cases, Loril-
lard Tobacco Co v Reillym the Court's five most conservative justices
were unanimous in finding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act preempted Massachusetts regulations restricting outdoor
and point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes ' m while the four more liberal
justices all reached the opposite conclusion;2 they read the federal stat-
ute as tolerating state regulation of the location, but not the content, of
cigarette ads.28 5
3. Doctrines of judicial federalism.
Congress's initiative in enacting restrictive legislation easily explains
the Court's failure to press a pro-federalism judicial agenda with respect
to habeas corpus. For the time being, Congress has gone at least as far as
the Court's majority would plausibly have wanted to go.28
The reasons that the pro-federalism justices have not pressed fur-
ther with Younger abstention are harder to plumb. The 1996 decision in
Quackenbush, which held Younger policies inapplicable to suits at law
(rather than equity),m seems partly explainable on grounds involving
methodological conservatism. Justices Scalia and Thomas, in particular,
profess to be textualists in matters of statutory construction. As such,
they might have found it awkward to read a statute conferring jurisdic-
tion over actions at law as licensing a residual judicial discretion to ab-
stain.m Suits for equitable remedies differ along this dimension, because
long tradition characterizes equity jurisdiction as discretionary.=
280 See note 222 and accompanying text.
281 The exception was Geier v American Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861,863 (2000).
m 121 S Ct 2404 (2001).
283 Id at 2419.
284 Id at 2444-45 (Stevens dissenting in part).
285 Id at 2440-41 (Stevens dissenting in part). In the one other case to be decided by 5-4, Geier v
American Honda Motor Co, three of the more liberal Justices (Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) dis-
sented,joined by Justice Thomas. 529 US at 867. In the only other two decisions in which there were
dissenting opinions, the dissents came from the Court's liberals-Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Stevens, in Egelhoff v Egelhoff, 121 S Ct 1322, 1325 (2001), and Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, in Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Shanklin, 529 US 344,345 (2000).
286 See notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
2V See Quackenbush, 517 US at 718-23.
288 See id at 731-32 (Scalia concurring) (insisting that discretionary dismissal of suits at law
should not be available under any circumstances).
289 For a general discussion, see Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 1234-35 (cited in
note 236) (discussing the equitable tradition and considering whether grants ofjurisdiction over suits
at law should also be interpreted as including a presumptive, albeit unstated, discretion to abstain).
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In NOPSI, which held that declaratory judgment actions by state
and local governments do not trigger Younger abstention,291 it may have
mattered that the state sought to extend Younger into the domain of
challenges to state economic regulation. Although substantive conserva-
tives dislike interference with traditional state criminal processes,m they
may feel differently about civil challenges to economic regulatory legisla-
tion in cases such as NOPSI. Within the coding framework of the politi-
cal scientists Segal and Spaeth, votes disfavoring "persons accused of
crimes" count as liberal,m whereas pro-business rulings in economic cases
count as conservative.29
It seems equally plausible, however, that the best explanation for
NOPSI-and, more generally, for the end to the expansion of Younger
doctrine-is an almost embarrassingly simple one: not even the most
pro-federalism justices would wish to go to the furthest possible extent in
minimizing federal interference with state judicial processes. If the Court
had mandated abstention in NOPSI, it would virtually always be possible
for state officials sued for declaratory or injunctive relief in federal court
effectively to remove the dispute to state court by filing a declaratory
judgment suit in a state forum.
Perhaps in contrast, the Court's approach to the final doctrine of
judicial federalism discussed in Part II, the adequate and independent
state ground doctrine, is virtually impossible to explain except by refer-
ence to the justices' substantively conservative commitments.m The para-
digmatic fact situation covered by Michigan v Long M is one in which a
state court has upheld a claim of constitutional right and cited both state
and federal authorities in support.2" (If a state court denies a constitu-
tional claim, citing both state and federal authorities, Supreme Court ju-
risdiction indisputably exists.2W) In cases fitting the paradigm, the conser-
vative Supreme Court that decided Long authorized itself to presume ju-
risdiction to determine whether state courts have gone too far in recog-
izing federal constitutional rights, notably including rights to procedural
protections in criminal cases."' Rejection of the Long presumption would
290 491 US 350 (1989).
291 Id at 368.
292 See notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
293 See id.
294 Segal and Spaeth, Supreme Court at 107,123 (cited in note 92).
295 See id at 305.
296 See Wells,30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 523-27 (cited in note 267) (explaining Long on this ba-
sis).
297 463 US 1032 (1983).
298 Id at 1037-38.
299 Id at 1044. See Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 525-26 (cited in note 236)
(noting the clear availability of Supreme Court review when a state court finds governmental action
"valid under both" state and federal constitutions).
300 By contrast, the Court has held the Long presumption that ambiguous state court decisions
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heighten comity among state and federal courts and decrease the num-
ber of cases in which the Supreme Court reviews and reverses state court
judgments. For the Court's generally pro-federalism majority, however,
considerations of federalism are outweighed by interests in advancing a
substantively conservative constitutional agenda3 '
4. A partial summary.
Clearly, the Supreme Court has not pressed its federalism revolution
along all possible paths. To draw the most banal conclusion, even the
most pro-federalism justices care about values besides federalism. But
the evidence also supports a more pointed inference: there are a number
of doctrinal areas in which the Court is more substantively conservative
than it is pro-federalism.m
B. Paths of Cautious Advance
At the core of the Court's federalism revival lie doctrines restricting
Congress's power to regulate private conduct and limiting Congress's ca-
pacity to impose regulatory burdens on state and local governments. In
these areas the Rehnquist Court unquestionably has been active. But it
has also been cautious, at least when dealing with the scope of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, largely because it is hemmed in by
considerations involving path dependence.
1. The path of limiting Congress's general regulatory power.
By the time of the stirring of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revo-
lution in the 1990s, the near fiasco of the Court's attempt to resist the
New Deal, coupled with the law's subsequent development, made it al-
rest on federal grounds to be inapplicable in several cases in which petitioners have sought review of
state court judgments denying claims of federal right. See Ylst v Nunnemaker, 501 US 797,806 (1991)
(refusing to presume that a state court decision adverse to a federal claim rested on federal substan-
tive rather than state procedural grounds); Coleman v Thompson, 501 US 722, 740 (1991) (same);
Capital Cities Media, Inc v Toole, 466 US 378,379 (1984) (same).
301 See Wells, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 523-27 (cited in note 267); Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro,
Federal Courts at 542-43 (cited in note 236) (suggesting that "jurisdictional rules tend to move in the
direction of allowing more intensive supervision of the law where the Supreme Court is in the proc-
ess of changing the relevant substantive rules and wants to assure itself that the state courts are com-
plying").
302 It is, of course, strongly arguable that judicial liberals' invocation of constitutional federalism
tends to be comparably strategic or result-oriented. Ironically, in the eyes of some, "[t]he story of the
modern state constitutionalism movement," under which state courts recognize broader state consti-
tutional rights than exist under the federal Constitution, "begins with" an article by the liberal na-
tionalist Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value ofDialogue and
the New Judicial Federalism, 28 Hastings Con L Q 93,93 (2001). As Friedman recognizes, Brennan's
call for a new judicial federalism came after the Supreme Court of the United States had taken a de-
cidedly conservative turn and had "suffered criticism for its programmatic, result-oriented cast." Id at
93-94.
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most unthinkable for the Court to attempt straightforwardly to limit
economic regulation by Congress.m Nor could the Court plausibly formu-
late a test forbidding Congress to act when its actual purpose involved
noneconomic justice. Such a test would threaten the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which rested primarily on an ideal of equality, not economic policy.'
In the legal and political culture of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, it is hard to imagine a judicial decision that would trigger
more outrage than one invalidating central provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, a statute now deeply assimilated into American life and
widely embraced as a triumph of simple justice.30
Against this background, the Court sent shudders through many lib-
eral nationalists when its 1995 decision in Lopez invalidated a federal
statute forbidding the possession of guns in school zones.3 Yet the
Court's opinion reflected the conservative justices' clear awareness that
they were on a path not only proven treacherous by history, but also oc-
cluded by judicial and congressional practice and entrenched expecta-
tions.m Lopez neither overruled any precedents nor revised the estab-
lished doctrinal formulations used to define Congress's commerce
power.m Instead, the Court's 5-4 ruling rested on a congeries of factorsm
that gave the decision uncertain precedential status and seemingly made
303 See, for example, Lopez, 514 US at 568-83 (Kennedy, joined by O'Connor, concurring):
The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the transition from
the economic system the Founders knew to the single, national market still emergent in our
own era counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to
support an exercise of national power.
304 See Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc v United States,379 US 241,257 (1964) ("That Congress was
legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid.").
305 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215, 1238
(2001) (characterizing the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a "super-statute" that has deep support in the
public consciousness, such that prior narrowing Court decisions "triggered a public normative alarm
that a bedrock statute was being undermined" and provoked restorative action by "[]arge majorities
in Congress"). The Court has manifested its reluctance to overturn precedents that have become
widely assimilated into day-to-day life in cases as otherwise dissimilar as Dickerson v United States,
530 US 428,443-44 (2000) (upholding Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)), and Planned Parent-
hood v Casey, 505 US 833,846 (1992) (affirming the "essential holding" of Roe v Wade, 410 US 113
(1973)).
306 514 US at 551.
307 See id at 553-58 (reciting the history ofjudicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause). In a
concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy was even more explicit: "The his-
tory of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause... counsels great restraint before the
Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of the national power. That
history gives me some pause." Id at 568.
308 See id at 558-59 (citing authorities establishing the applicable tests of congressional power).
See also id at 573-74 (Kennedy, joined by O'Connor, concurring) (expressly affirming that Lopez
does not threaten the Court's decisions in Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v McClung
upholding the constitutionality of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
309 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich L Rev 674,692 (1995) (observing that
"[t]he Court's decision rests on the confluence of almost a dozen factors making the case virtually
unique").
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it easy to evade. In the wake of Lopez, it apparently would suffice for
Congress to amend the statute to prevent the possession within a school
zone of any gun that had traveled in interstate commerce - a condition
sure to be satisfied in nearly every case.
United States v Morrison,3 ' which invalidates the federal Violence
Against Women Act, undoubtedly goes further, but not much further, by
establishing that only commercial activities are subject to federal regula-
tion under the third prong of the Lopez test.312 As Morrison demon-
strates, this is by no means a trivial limitation, but neither is it one that
appears to threaten the great bulk of federal regulatory legislation.3
Opportunities will remain for the Court to define limits and, in the
process, to invite arguments that its successive rationales for decision im-
ply yet further limits.314 For at least the intermediate term, however, it ap-
310 See Lopez,514 US at 561-62 (noting that the challenged statute "contains no jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question af-
fects interstate commerce").
311 529 US 598 (2000).
312 Id at 610-11.
313 See Dorf, 31 Rutgers L J at 744 (cited in note 13) (noting that the Court "will continue to
give Congress wide latitude").
314 Justice Thomas has urged that the Court comprehensively reexamine current doctrine based
on "the original understanding" of the Commerce Clause. See, for example, Morrison, 529 US at 627
(Thomas concurring); Printz, 521 US at 937 (Thomas concurring) (advocating a "return to an inter-
pretation better rooted in the Clause's original understanding");Lopez,514 US at 584-602 (Thomas
concurring) (observing "that our case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the
Commerce Clause"). Without meaning to prejudge what an originalist inquiry might yield, see Law-
rence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S Ct Rev 125,125-27 (discussing
the need to "translate" the understandings of the framing and ratifying generation in order to express
their meaning in a dramatically changed context), I would insist- as I believe that even a majority of
the pro-federalism justices would agree-that considerations of path dependence sharply circum-
scribe the Court's practical discretion. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, has said so ex-
pressly:
[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the sta-
bility of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point. Stare decisis oper-
ates with great force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place
respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.
Lopez, 514 US at 574 (Kennedy, joined by O'Connor, concurring).
In a thoughtful essay, Donald Regan has argued that apart from regulating commerce in the nar-
row sense-the interstate movement of goods and their sales as part of the stream of commerce-
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause should be limited to matters of general na-
tional interest in which the states are separately incompetent. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think
about the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich L Rev
554,583 (1995). According to Regan, this formulation reflects (at a suitably high level of generality)
the original understanding of the commerce power within the constitutional design. See id at 555. He
also believes that it captures both the scope and limits of appropriate national power under a struc-
ture designed to promote robust federalism. See id at 557-59.
Though attractive in principle, Regan's proposed formula would be a nightmare to implement-
as is revealed, I think, in his effort to identify areas in which the states are and are not separately in-
competent, including gun control legislation. See id at 611 (discussing the relevance of state incapac-
ity to enact gun control legislation, due to the political influence of groups such as the National Rifle
Association). Because state incompetence can be measured only by reference to substantively desir-
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pears that any straitening will-and for reasons involving path depend-
ence virtually must- stop short of calling into question the constitution-
ality of New Deal-type regulatory legislation and, of comparable sali-
ence, the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
With respect to the reach of Congress's power to regulate private
conduct under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, considerations
of path dependence do not leave the Court similarly circumscribed. But
neither, even prior to the Court's federalism revival, was this a path that
offered much potential for significant cutbacks on federal authority. As
long ago as the Civil Rights Cases,3 5 decided in 1883, the Court estab-
lished that the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions and Congress's au-
thority to "enforce" them extend only to state (and not private) action. 6
It would be a mistake to ascribe no significance to the Court's recent
decisions holding that Congress cannot regulate private conduct under
Section 5. The precedents that gave a narrow interpretation of Con-
gress's power are themselves controversial;1 7 a Court dominated by lib-
eral nationalists might have moved toward a more expansive conception
of Congress's mandate. Even so, the Court's recent decisions reflect no
dramatic advance toward a more robust constitutional federalism.
2. The path of limiting Congress's power to regulate state and
local governments.
Considerations of path dependence have also made it difficult for
the Court to establish broadly effective limits on Congress's capacity to
regulate state and local governments under Article I. In a 1968 decision,
Maryland v Wirtz,"8 the Court held that Congress could regulate the
wages and hours of state and local government employees on the same
able outcomes that the states would be unable to attain in the absence of federal legislation, the req-
uisite judgments would be almost transparently political. Regan may have identified a standard that
conscientious legislators should view as defining the proper limit of their Commerce Clause powers,
but the limit is not sufficiently manageable for a court to enforce it directly. For proposals that simi-
larly call for heightened judicial scrutiny of Congress's deliberative processes in enacting legislation
under the Commerce Clause, see Jackson, 111 Harv L Rev at 2245-46 (cited in note 5); Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Tex L Rev 795,823-26 (1996).
315 109 US 3 (1883).
316 Id at 11. Cases presenting the question whether "state action" or solely private conduct has
occurred, and thus whether constitutional constraints apply, are accordingly another predictable bat-
tleground between conservative pro-federalism justices and more liberal justices eager to extend na-
tional authority. For example, in the Court's sole "state action" case during the 2000 Term, Brentwood
Academy v Tennessee Secondary SchoolAthletic Association, 121 S Ct 924 (2001), four of the charac-
teristically conservative, pro-federalism justices found no state action to be present, id at 935, al-
though Justice O'Connor joined the other four justices in reaching a contrary conclusion, id at 927.
317 See, for example, United States v Guest, 383 US 745,782-85 (1966) (Brennan concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided and that Con-
gress had authority under Section 5 to regulate private conduct).
318 392 US 183 (1968).
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basis that it regulated their private-sector counterparts."9 Less than a
decade later, by a vote of 5-4, the Court reversed itself. In National
League of Cities v Usery,' 0 it ruled that the Tenth Amendment forbids
Congress "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions."3' But the Na-
tional League of Cities test proved difficult if not impossible to adminis-
ter,3 and ten years later the Court reversed itself again. In Garcia v San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,m the Court overruled National
League of Cities and announced that the principal if not exclusive protec-
tions of state and local governmental integrity must come from the po-
litical process.34
In Garcia, then-Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor both wrote
dissenting opinions forecasting a day when Garcia itself would be over-
ruled and the regime of National League of Cities restored? But a move
to achieve that result- especially if by a precarious 5-4 majority-would
risk making the Court look foolishly inconsistent. It also would invite de-
risive speculations about the Court's proneness to flip-flop with turns of
the political tide and raise questions about the justices' capacity to func-
tion as relatively apolitical umpires of federal-state relations?
Rather than doubling back along the precedential path, overruling
Garcia, and returning to National League of Cities, the Court has so far
elected to take a different, much more modest route toward the protec-
tion of federalism values. In New York, it laid down the clear but limited
rule that Congress may not enact legislation under Article I that singles
out state legislative bodies and compels them to legislate.m In Printz, the
Court extended New York's noncommandeering principle to apply to
state and local executive officials.
319 Id at 195-99.
320 426 US 833 (1976).
321 Id at 852.
322 See Garcia, 469 US at 538-47.
323 469 US 528 (1985).
324 Id at 551-54.
325 Id at 579-80 (Rehnquist dissenting), 589 (O'Connor dissenting).
326 See Meltzer, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at 1050 (cited in note 32):
[E]ven if five of today's Justices would not, as a matter of first impression, have joined the Gar-
cia opinion, they might hesitate to overrule it in a case like Alden. For to have done so would
have meant that in each of the last four decades ... the Court would have shifted its position on
whether Congress may subject state and local governments to fair labor standards. Imagine this
citation: Maryland v Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,469 U.S.
528 (1985), overruled by Alden v Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
327 505 US at 149.
328 521 US at 935 ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivi-
sions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
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The rules of New York and Printz are important, but also narrow.'
As noted above, they protect state and local governments only against
peculiar forms of federal legislation that single out governmental entities
and expressly command them to enact legislation or enforce federal
law.n More recent decisions have expressly acknowledged Congress's
power to regulate state and local governments under the Commerce
Clause, even while denying that Congress can strip the states of sover-
eign immunity and subject them to private suits for money damages.3'
What is more, decisions limiting Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause operate as a bar only to federal legislation framed as an
unconditioned command. New York and Printz do not affect congres-
sional authority under the Spending Clause, as upheld in South Dakota v
Dole,.3 to condition federal financial grants on the states' performance of
regulatory functions, including the enactment of legislation.333 In the not
too distant future, the Court will surely be called upon to reconsider
Dole. When it does so, the outcome will be difficult to predict,3 though I
would again expect considerations of path dependence to exert a large
influence.33 For now, my argument is not that the Court has no room for
329 See, for example, Evan H. Caminker, Print, State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalism,
1997 S Ct Rev 199,199-200 (noting that some would characterize Printz's "immediate practical im-
pact as relatively minor"); Jesse H. Choper, On the Difference in Importance between Supreme Court
Doctrine andActual Consequences:A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term,19 Cardozo L
Rev 2259,2269 (1998) (referring to Printz as "somewhat ambiguous in scope" and "of very limited
consequence at all levels of impact").
330 See notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
331 See Kimel v Florida Board of Regents,528 US 62,78-79,91 (2000) (acknowledging congres-
sional authority to enact the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and to make it binding on
states, but holding that the states enjoy sovereign immunity from unconsented private suits for dam-
ages under the Act);Alden v Maine, 527 US 706,755 (1999).
332 483 US 203 (1987).
333 Id at 211-12.
334 Because Spending Clause doctrine permits Congress to achieve results through the power of
the purse that it could not effect by direct regulation under the Commerce Clause, commentators re-
gard it as anomalous. See, for example, Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending after Lopez, 95 Colum
L Rev 1911,1914 (1995) (noting that "prevailing Spending Clause doctrine appears to vitiate much of
the import of Lopez");Thomas R.McCoy and Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's
Trojan Horse, 1988 S Ct Rev 85,86-87. But two of the justices most eager to protect constitutional
federalism, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, have maintained that when the government
acts as a subsidizer or a purchaser, rather than a regulator, only the loosest constitutional restrictions
apply. See, for example, Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533,553-54 (2001) (Scaliajoined by
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas, dissenting) (arguing that a selective funding program is not co er-
cive and therefore does not "abridge" the freedom of speech); National Endowment for the Arts v
Finley, 524 US 569,599 (1998) (Scalia, joined by Thomas, concurring) ("I regard the distinction be-
tween 'abridging' speech and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of which the Frst
Amendment is inapplicable."). See also Young, 1999 S Ct Rev at 35, 62 (cited in note 17) (noting
Chief Justice Rehnquist's resistance to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
335 Apart from the precedential force of the decision itself the Court attempted to rationalize
the distinction between coercive regulation and conditions on the award of gratuities in College Sav-
ings Bank, 527 US at 686-87. The Court would not need to overrule South Dakota v Dole expressly
in order to limit Congress's spending clause authority significantly. In Dole itselt, the Court observed
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movement, but only that, for reasons involving path dependence, it has
tended to move and is likely to continue to move slowly, even cautiously.
With respect to Congress's power to regulate the states under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, City of Boerne clearly confines
Congress to "remedy[ing] or prevent[ing] unconstitutional actions" as
defined by the courts.3 This formulation importantly crimps congres-
sional power. In Professor Tribe's words, it "saddle[s]" Section 5 legisla-
tion for the first time "with something between intermediate and strict
scrutiny, effectuating what can only be understood as a substantial, albeit
not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality."' 3' Nonetheless, the
Court's concern with path dependence is plainly signaled by its failure to
overrule any previous cases upholding federal legislation to enforce the
Civil War Amendments. In particular, the Court has distinguished and af-
firmed decisions upholding voting rights legislation through which Con-
gress has forbidden practices-such as the use of literacy tests-likely to
be used "to deny and abridge voting rights on racial grounds."3
that "our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants
might be illegitimate if unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs."
483 US at 207-08, quoting Massachusetts v United States, 435 US 444, 461 (1978). It also stated that
some financial incentives might "pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' Dole, 483
US at 211, quoting Steward Machine Co v Davis, 301 US 548,590 (1937). Although the Court might
attempt to enforce these or similar restrictions, significant obstacles would confront it. For analysis of
the difficulties involved in identifying impermissible "coercion," see Sullivan, 106 Harv L Rev at 27
(cited in note 119). It would be equally difficult, as Professor Meltzer has observed, to enforce a dis-
tinction, proposed by Baker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1916 (cited in note 334), and McCoy and Friedman,
1988 S Ct Rev at 103 (cited in note 334),
between those conditions specifying the purpose for which funds will be spent (which are valid)
and those seeking to purchase compliance with a regulatory objective (which are invalid insofar
as they regulate the states in a fashion that Congress could not undertake directly). Does a fed-
eral requirement that grants to a state university for biological research not be used to subsidize
action infringing valid patents specify how funds shall be spent or purchase a regulatory objec-
tive? Can the grants also be conditioned on the university's not infringing the copyright laws in
its preparation of course materials for students-on the theory (well known by university fund-
raisers) that money raised for one activity (biological research), by freeing up funds in the gen-
eral budget, may indirectly support other activities (operation of the copy center)?
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 S Ct Rev 1,54 n 250
(internal citations omitted).
336 521 US at 508.
337 Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-16 at 959 (cited in note 214).
338 City of Boerne,521 US at 533, quoting South Carolina v Katzenbach,383 US 301,355 (1966)
(Black concurring and dissenting). See Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama v Garrett, 121 S Ct
955,967 (2001) (distinguishing and approving South Carolina, which upheld the remedial scheme es-
tablished by the Voting Rights Act of 1965). The Court's view of the constitutionality of key provi-
sions of the current Voting Rights Act, 42 USC §§ 1971,1973a-1973p, 1973aa-1973bb-1 (1994), which
includes provisions going further than those previously upheld, is impossible to predict with confi-
dence. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv L Rev 1663,
1736-37 (2001) (noting the looming issue of the constitutionality of provisions of the Voting Rights
Act and proposing an analysis to meet possible objections); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and
Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and RemediesAfter Flores, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 725,731-41 (1998)
(arguing that the "two key provisions of the modern Voting Rights Act" should both survive applica-
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C. The Path of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
The Supreme Court's expansive sovereign immunity decisions resist
simple explanation. As I have suggested, sovereign immunity doctrine
would appear to be a crude and largely ineffectual device for protecting
federalism. To recapitulate briefly, sovereign immunity generally does
not bar properly pleaded suits against state officials, either for injunctive
or for damages relief. Nor does it confer any protection on local govern-
ments. Nor, finally, does it safeguard even the states against suits by the
United States. As commentators have emphasized, the Court's sovereign
immunity decisions thus create an incentive for Congress to police state
compliance with federal law through federal oversight and federal law-
suits-hardly a victory for federalism, if it were to occur.39 Why, then,
does the Court devote so much energy to refining and incrementally ex-
panding a doctrine that promises the states so little ultimate practical
protection and gives local governments none at all?
1. Why sovereign immunity?
As noted above, the Eleventh Amendment expressly bars only suits
in federal court against a state by "Citizens of another State," not suits by
a state's own citizens to enforce federal law. If anything, the constitu-
tional text thus embarrasses the Court's enterprise, and the Court has not
contended otherwise .' Nor can the Court's sovereign immunity deci-
sions be explained as dictated by the original understanding. The history
is complex and controverted. In Seminole Tribe, the Court declined to
rely on history alone, but instead emphasized that relevant historical data
are consonant with the understanding of sovereign immunity reflected in
past cases, most notably Hans.3' In Alden, the Court rested more heavily
on evidence of historical understandings, but its analysis was plausibly
controverted by Justice Souter's dissent on nearly every salient point.
3
Just as history will not bear the full weight of the Court's sovereignimmunity rulings, neither will stare decisis.The Court sometimes suggests
that Hans must be accepted as a fixed point and that its decisions reflect
the careful application of Hans's logic.3" But this suggestion lacks credi-
tion of the "congruence" and "proportionality" test of City of Boerne).
339 See Young, 1999 S Ct Rev at 62-63 (cited in note 17) (observing that federal suits against
state governments "would surely be both an irritant in federal-state relations and a step backward for
state independence").
340 See, for example, Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 69 ("The dissent's lengthy analysis of the text of
the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man.").
341 Id at 68-70, discussing Hans, 134 US 1.
342 See Alden, 527 US at 741-45.
343 See id at 762-94 (Souter dissenting).
344 See, for example, Kimel v Florida Board of Regents,528 US 62,79-80 (2000) (protesting that
"the present dissenters' refusal to accept the validity and natural import of decisions like Hans, ren-
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bility. Hans could be read narrowly-for example, as recognizing that the
states enjoy a common law sovereign immunity, not directly displaced by
Article III, but nonetheless capable of being stripped by Congress.?"
Moreover, the Court's recent, harsh practice with respect to decisions
other than Hans belies rationales rooted in stare decisis. Over the past
five years, the Court has expressly overruled at least two cases that had
limited state sovereign immunity.
Any credible explanation of the Court's drive to expand sovereign
immunity doctrine must clearly involve constitutional federalism. As I
have suggested, however, the bare invocation of federalism seems frus-
tratingly inadequate. Without more, it cannot explain why the Court has
pressed sovereign immunity doctrine as far as it has, especially in com-
parison with other doctrines that would seem better adapted to advanc-
ing federalism values.
The best explanation includes two parts. The first involves path de-
pendence. A conservative Court wishes to expand protections for consti-
tutional federalism. Significant obstacles impede aggressive steps to pro-
tect federalism along other paths, even though the Court has by no
means been thwarted entirely. By contrast, the Court has learned how to
deploy sovereign immunity to symbolize and protect federalism. 3V Pro-
fessor Fried has described the Court's reliance on sovereign immunity to
promote federalism as akin to "using a screwdriver to pound nails."'3 If
so, I would suggest that the Court's majority regards itself as practiced
and adept in the use of its screwdriver and as prone to mishap when it
wields a hammer.4'
A second partial explanation of the Court's sovereign immunity de-
cisions involves the conservative justices' characteristic (although by no
means universal) hostility to suits for money damages in federal court,30
dered over a full century ago by this Court, makes it difficult to engage in additional meaningful de-
bate on the place of state sovereign immunity in the Constitution"); Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 68 (as-
serting that consideration of Congress's capacity to abrogate the states' immunity from suit "must
proceed with fidelity to [the] century-old doctrine" originating in Hans).
345 See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 117 (Souter dissenting). But see Meltzer, 1996 S Ct Rev at 25-
27 (cited in note 335) (emphasizing language in Hans that is difficult to reconcile with the theory that
it recognized only a common law immunity subject to abrogation by Congress).
346 See College Savings Bank, 527 US at 680, overruling Parden v Terminal Railway of the Ala-
bama State Docks Department,377 US 184 (1964); Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 66, overruling Pennsyl-
vania v Union Gas Co, 491 US 1 (1989).
347 One of the characteristic features giving rise to path dependence is a familiar human ten-
dency to "over-exploit 'good' actions that pay off well early" and, over time, to become "lock[ed]-in"
to a suboptimal pattern of behavior. Arthur, Increasing Returns at 152 (cited in note 23).
348 Fried, Supreme Court Folly, NY Times at A17 (cited in note 32).
349 See Meltzer, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at 1052 (cited in note 32) ("Lacking a robust theory of
what limits (or what judicially enforceable limits) the Constitution places on congressional regula-
tory authority, the Court directs its primary effort to limiting the scope of the remedies that Congress
may deploy.").
350 See Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denation-
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especially against state and local governments and their officials. Al-
though sovereign immunity does not preclude most properly pleaded
complaints against state officers or against local governments and their
officials, the Court has developed a number of subconstitutional doc-
trines that pose considerable barriers.35' In particular, the Court has made
it extremely difficult to establish local governments' causal responsibility
for their officials' tortious misconduct in suits under Section 1983.3
When the Court's sovereign immunity cases are viewed in conjunc-
tion with its Section 1983 cases involving municipal liability, it becomes
apparent that the pro-federalism majority is pursuing a multi-front battle
against suits for damages that disrupt state and local governments' budg-
ets and planning processes: the states are protected by sovereign immu-
nity, while local governments achieve considerable (although not total)
protection from the Court's construal of statutory standards for govern-
mental liability.3' If this is the pro-federalism justices' general strategy,
then the risk of damages suits against the states by the federal govern-
ment-cited by critics as showing that the Court's sovereign immunity
rulings may do more to undermine than to advance federalismn-' -can
also be seen in a new light. Precluded by considerations of path depend-
ence from holding directly that local governments possess sovereign im-
munity,'55 the Court has abandoned any aspiration to impose a single, ele-
gant solution on the "problem" of litigious disruptions of governmental
budgetary and planning processes. Its approach is determinedly case-by-
case.
Moreover, insofar as indemnification policies may make state and
local governments the real parties in interest in damages actions against
their officials,"6 one can only speculate that the conservative, pro-
federalism justices are reasonably satisfied with the balance struck by of-
ficial immunity doctrines."7 Although suable in principle for any violation
of federal law, state and local officials generally enjoy a personal (as op-
posed to "sovereign") immunity from damages liability unless they vio-
alization of Federal Law, 31 Rutgers L J691,706-18 (2000) (discussing the conservative justices' hos-
tility to litigation generally, but especially to litigation against the government).
351 For a richly provocative probing of the connections, see Jeffries, 84 Va L Rev 47 (cited in
note 35).
352 See note 226 and accompanying text.
353 See id.
354 See note 339 and accompanying text.
355 See notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
356 See note 229 and accompanying text.
357 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 Notre Dame L Rev
859,902 (2000) (noting that "the Court appears to conceive of the doctrine of qualified immunity as
designed to produce the optimal amount of deterrence of state violations of federal laws");Jeffries,
84 Va L Rev at 53 (cited in note 35) (asserting that "the law of governmental liability for constitu-
tional torts aligns on a requirement of fault" and claiming that "a constitutional tort regime based on
fault is wise policy").
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late "clearly established" federal rights.3 5 Under this standard, officials
(and their indemnifiers) cannot be liable for reasonable mistakes, but
only for clear transgressions of previously specified rights.35'9
Liberal critics have argued that the existing regime of liability and
immunity rules in officer suits, when coupled with doctrines that make it
difficult to prevail in direct suits against governmental bodies, fails to
provide fair compensation to victims, an adequate deterrent to official
misconduct, or a sufficient incentive to state and local governments to
train and supervise their officials.3'0 But this is where the line is effectively
drawn by a series of interlocking doctrines developed by a conservative
Court. Federal law can be enforced through suits for injunctions against
ongoing violations of legal rights;.3" deprivations of clearly established
rights are generally actionable in suits for damages against government
officials; but state and local governments generally are not liable, even
through suits against their officers, for reasonable mistakes that resulted
in rights violations.
The crucial point should not be lost in the details: sovereign immu-
nity does not stand alone in protecting governmental treasuries from
suits for damages. Whether approved or disapproved, the Court's sover-
eign immunity decisions are part of a broader agenda for the protection
of a conservative vision of constitutional federalism, and that agenda has
a statutory as well as a constitutional component.
358 See notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
359 Within the sample examined by one recent study, defendants prevailed on qualified immu-
nity motions in roughly 80 percent of cases in which the defense was asserted. See Diana Hassel, Liv-
ing a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo L Rev 123,145 n 6 (1999).
360 For critical discussions, see Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 Ga L Rev 845 (2001);Jack M. Beerman, Munici-
pal Liability for Constitutional Torts, 48 DePaul L Rev 627 (1999); Mark R. Brown, The Demise of
Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?, 79 Iowa L Rev 273 (1994); Laura Oren,Immunity
and Accountability in Civil Rights Law: Who Should Pay?, 50 U Pitt L Rev 935 (1989); Schuck,Suing
the Government (cited in note 229).
361 See Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 US 261,294 (1997) (O'Connor, joined by
Scalia and Thomas, concurring) (arguing that a Young suit against a state officer is available, because
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, "where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective").
362 See Harlow, 457 at 815 (recognizing immunity of officials who have not violated clearly es-
tablished rights).
363 For a general defense premised on the notion that governmental liability should be fault-
based, see Jeffries, 84 Va L Rev at 53 (cited in note 35). For the argument that the doctrinal structure
created by the conservative pro-federalism justices is ironic, if not self-defeating, because it encour-
ages suits for injunctions that may be more invasive than the suits for damages that are effectively
barred, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury,
and Section 1983,53 Stan L Rev 1311,1314 (2001).
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2. Exceptions that prove the rule.
To the thesis that I have just developed, one important qualification
needs to be added-but it is a qualification that is entirely consistent
with my claims that the Court's protection of state and local treasuries
has a patchwork quality and that the Court's federalism agenda often
bends to considerations of substantive conservatism.
Although Alden holds that sovereign immunity generally protects
the states from private suits for damages even in state courts,4 the Court
appears to recognize two exceptions. First, the Court unanimously in-
sisted in a 1994 decision, Reich v Collins,-16 that states that promise refund
remedies for coercively collected taxes are constitutionally obliged to
provide such remedies, "the sovereign immunity States traditionally en-
joy in their own courts notwithstanding." Second, the Court has sug-
gested that state sovereign immunity must yield in suits asserting takings
claims. 7
It hardly seems coincidental that these exceptions to generally ap-
plicable sovereign immunity doctrine both involve "old property" rights
generally looked on with more solicitude by conservatives than by liber-
als.3' Even in the core of sovereign immunity doctrine, the most pro-
federalism justices' substantive conservatism appears to exert a shaping
influence.
364 527 US at 712.
365 513 US 106 (1994).
366 Id at 110. Further complicating the picture are cases appearing to mandate that decisions es-
tablishing the invalidity of state taxes must be given full retroactive effect, thereby triggering an obli-
gation to make refund payments from state treasuries, even when the decisions of invalidity are novel
or surprising. See, for example, Harper v Virginia Department of Taxation,509 US 86,97 (1993);James
B. Beam Distilling Co v Georgia, 501 US 529,544 (1991);American TruckingAssociation v Smith, 496
US 167,188 (1990). In Harper, 509 US at 97, the only one of these cases to produce a majority opin-
ion, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that "[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the
parties before it, that rule ... must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct re-
view." In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connorjoined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the
Court should apply the "traditional equitable balancing test" to determine whether retroactivity was
appropriate. Id at 117. Applying such a test, she would have weighed the effect on states forced to re-
fund huge sums. Id at 129-30. Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part, expressed
views similar to Justice O'Connor's See id at 110-11. Concurring, Justice Scalia sharply attacked the
practice of making judicial opinions prospective only, terming this practice "the handmaid of judicial
activism" and "quite incompatible with the judicial power." Id at 105-06.
367 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v LosAngeles County, 482 US
304,307,314-16 (1987) (affirming that the Constitution mandates just compensation for takings of
private property for public use). But see Richard H. Seamons, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign
Immunity, 76 Wash L Rev 1067,1077 (2001) (arguing that First English "only hints, without firmly
deciding... that the just-compensation principle overrides the sovereign immunity principle").
36 See Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75 Notre
Dame L Rev 919, 932-33, 942 (2000) (seeking to rationalize the distinction partly by reference to
nineteenth-century judicial history and partly on the ground that new property claims are more
likely to subject states to large and unpredictable financial dislocations).
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IV. PERSPECTIVES
So far I have sought to explain the nature and limits of the Supreme
Court's federalism revival by identifying considerations that motivate
and constrain the most pro-federalism justices. In this Part, I seek further
perspective on the Court's recent decisions by examining their methodo-
logical assumptions and their implicit conception of the Supreme Court's
role.
A. Methodological Considerations and Constraints
In implementing its federalism revival, the Supreme Court has not
pursued a single methodology in either constitutional or statutory cases.
For example, in construing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
City of Boerne, the Court rested heavily on an originalist examination of
language and legislative history 9 By contrast, in cases involving the
scope of Congress's power to regulate private conduct under the Com-
merce Clause, only Justice Thomas has called for the Court to pursue
originalist inquiries.3 0
In limiting Congress's powers to regulate state and local govern-
ments directly in New York and Printz, the Court depended on infer-
ences from the Constitution's structure' not tied tightly to particular
constitutional language.37 The opinions discussed the original constitu-
tional understanding,n but in Printz Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
most directly relevant historical evidence was "not conclusive."37
Although he found support for the Court's ruling in a number of sources,
he termed judicial precedent "most conclusive[ ] in the present litiga-
tion."37
369 See 521 US at 520-24. See also Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints
on Section 5 Powers, 53 Stan L Rev 1127,1158-65 (2001) (noting that "the Court relied heavily on an
originalist methodology," but arguing that the majority misapprehended the relevant history).
370 See, for example, Morrison, 529 US at 627 (Thomas concurring); Printz v United States, 521
US at 937 (Thomas concurring); Lopez, 514 US at 584-602 (Thomas concurring).
371 See Printz, 521 US at 918-25.
372 According to Printz, the states' retention of a residual sovereignty "is reflected throughout
the Constitution's text," including its enumeration of only limited congressional powers. Id at 919.
See also id at 923 n 13 ("Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional pro-
visions .... and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly.").
373 See Printz, 521 US at 905-23; New York, 505 US at 163-66.
374 521 US at 918. Prior to Printz, several commentators had concluded that congressional reli-
ance on state officials to enforce federal law accorded with the Constitution's original understanding.
See, for example, Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum L Rev 1001,1042-50 (1995);Powell,79 Va L Rev
at 661-64 (cited in note 52). For a critique of Printz and especially of the majority's treatment of ar-
guments involving the original understanding, see Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case:
The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U Colo L Rev 953 (1999).
375 Printz, 521 US at 925.
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An interesting disparity thus arises. As Professor Tribe has noted, in
cases involving substantive rights, the conservative justices commonly
scorn arguments based on inferences from the Constitution's structure
and otherwise supported principally by judicial precedent.376 By contrast,
in federalism cases, the conservatives themselves rely on structural infer-
ences supported by judicial precedent, with other kinds of argument-
including those based on the Constitution's plain language-sometimes
relegated to subordinate roles.37
The Court's sovereign immunity cases betray methodological incon-
sistencies even among themselves. In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice
Rehnquist framed the Court's holding as based on the Eleventh Amend-
ment"-even though he recognized that the Amendment's plain text
would not support the result.37 Instead the Chief Justice relied on the
view of the original understanding adopted in Hans and, in response to
challenges to that view, on stare decisis.tm With minimal engagement, he
derided the principal dissenting opinion for "disregard[ing] our case law
in favor of a theory [of the original understanding] cobbled together
from law review articles and its own version of historical events."'7 In
Alden, the Court sought a new foundation for its sovereign immunity ju-
risprudence, not in the Eleventh Amendment but in the Tenth Amend-
ment and the original understanding of the Constitution's structure.3
Overall, a defender of the Court's approach might assert that the
five-justice, pro-federalism majority has followed the original under-
standing except when considerations of path dependence make that
course infeasible: only in defining Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause has the Court not tried to reach results consistent with
originalist principles. But this explanation is too neat. Among other
things, it cannot account for why the Court has so regularly fractured
along the same 5-4 line, even when the dissenting justices, as much as the
majority, have engaged in evidently sincere originalist argumentation.3 13
376 See Laurence H.Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy:Does the Privileges orlImmunities Revival Por-
tend the Future- Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 Harv L Rev 110,139-40,158-72 (1999).
377 See id at 139-40.
378 See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 76.
379 Id at 69.
3So Id at 68-70. This response was not unprecedented. The plurality opinion in Welch v Texas
Department of Highways and Transportation, 483 US 468,479,483-84 (1987), also described historical
evidence on the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment as "ambiguous" and defended Hans largely on
the basis of stare decisis. Justice Scalia took a similar approach in his opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part in Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co, 491 US 1, 31-32,34-35 (1989).
381 Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 68.
382 See Alden, 527 US at 712-13 (terming references to Eleventh Amendment immunity as
"something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is lim-
ited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment").
383 See, for example,Alden,527 US at 762-94 (Souter dissenting) (arguing that the founding and
ratifying generation did not regard sovereign immunity as unalterable by statute); Printz, 521 US at
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Nor can this defense explain why the Court has paid so little heed to the
original understanding along some of the quiet fronts of the federalism
revolution-for example, with respect to the dormant Commerce
Clause.-
The Court has also taken a variable approach to cases that formally
involve statutory interpretation. Sometimes the Court invokes literal and
historical understandings of statutory terms. In other contexts, the
Court cites an interpretive canon that Congress would not have wished
to regulate state governments or their officials unless it made its intent to
do so unmistakably clear.3 In yet other contexts, the Court deploys
interpretive presumptions that Congress would have wished to authorize
the creation of judge-made doctrines shielding governmental officials
from suit or otherwise protecting constitutional federalism.3m As I have
noted, however, the Court frequently relaxes the application of pro-
federalism interpretive principles in preemption cases in which a finding
of preemption advances substantively conservative ends."
Overall, much of the Court's pattern of pro-federalism and substan-
tively conservative decisions is consistent with the view of legal realists3S
and those political scientists who regard the justices as engaged in the
single-minded pursuit of policy goals.34 The alignment of data in support
945-54 (Stevens dissenting) (arguing that the original understanding contemplated federal mandates
to state officials to enforce federal law); Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 101-16 (Souter dissenting) (dis-
cussing the history and original understanding of the Eleventh Amendment). As noted above, in
Seminole Tribe, the majority attempted to fend off the dissenting Justices' forceful originalist argu-
ments at least partly by relying on the precedential authority of Hans, see notes 341,380-81 and ac-
companying text; and in Printz, Justice Scalia stated flatly that the strongest arguments supporting
the Court's conclusion came from precedent, see note 375 and accompanying text. See James Eugene
Fitzgerald, Comment, State Sovereign Immunity:Searchingfor Stability,48 UCLA L Rev 1203,1220,
1233 (2001) (concluding that "compelling historical arguments" are paired against one another in the
sovereign immunity cases and that "[r]eliance on the grab bag of history is simply indecisive").
384 See notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
385 For criticisms of the Court's purportedly historically grounded interpretations of Section
1983, and suggestions that its conclusions are in fact policy driven, see, for example, Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and MunicipalAccountability under
Section 1983, 62 S Cal L Rev 539,541 (1989); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional
Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 Mich L Rev 82,86 n 24 (1989).
386 See, for example, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452,460-61,467 (1991); Will v Michigan De-
partment of State Police, 491 US 58,64-65 (1989).
387 See, for example, Tower v Glover,467 US 914,920 (1984) (involving official immunity in suits
under Section 1983); Younger, 401 US at 43-46 (invoking traditions of equity to justify federal judi-
cial abstention in a suit to enjoin state judicial proceedings).
388 See Part III.A.2.
389 See, for example, Wells, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 502-03 (cited in note 267) (arguing that
substantive interests independent of doctrine and jurisdictional policy determine outcomes in federal
courts cases).
390 See, for example, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 Emory L J 583,592-95 (2001) (hypothesizing that the justices are
"single-minded seekers of legal policy" but that they will temper their decisions, for strategic reasons,
to "avoid reaching decisions considerably outside the range acceptable to the legislature and the
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of this theory is not perfect, however. I have suggested that the justices'
methodological commitments play an independent explanatory role in
some, though not all, cases. Moreover, other plausible explanations of the
justices' decisions also exist. One emerges from Ronald Dworkin's well-
known theory that judges deciding "hard cases" must choose among rival
legal theories" According to Dworkin, selection among otherwise plau-
sible theories requires judges and justices to determine which would por-
tray existing law in the "best" normative light or emphasize principles
that most deserve to be extended into the future.-9 Within a framework
of this kind, assessment of the normative attractiveness of competing
conceptions of constitutional federalism is a constitutive element of legal
reasoning, not the prelude to pursuit of an external policy aim. Consid-
erations of substantive conservatism can come similarly into play in an
assessment of which interpretation counts as "best."
The evidence of the Court's federalism cases also fits Duncan Ken-
nedy's depiction of judges as motivated to test whether results that they
find attractive on ideological grounds can be achieved within the me-
dium of law."According to his account, ideology spurs imaginative ef-
fort, but does not guarantee its success. Sometimes perceived legal im-
pediments will prove insurmountable.
Overall, the pattern of the federalism revival confirms that ideology
is relevant to Supreme Court decisionmaking, but does not establish pre-
cisely how the influence occurs. Despite its apparent methodological in-
consistencies, the Court operates within the conventions of legal argu-
mentation. Never does the majority simply impose its will in the absence
of colorable supporting arguments. Nevertheless, the key to understand-
ing the federalism revival does not lie in any particular methodology 3"
president") (internal citations omitted); Segal and Spaeth,Supreme Court at 64-73 (cited in note 92)
(developing an "attitudinal model" according to which judges and justices decide cases based solely
on their ideological values).
391 See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 255-56 (cited in note 25):
Hard cases arise, for any judge, when his threshold test does not discriminate between two or
more interpretations of some statute or line of cases.Then he must choose between eligible in-
terpretations by asking which shows the community's structure of institutions and decisions-
its public standards as a whole-in a better light from the standpoint of political morality.
392 See id at 256,257.
393 See Duncan KennedyA Critique ofAdjudication: Fin de Siecle 157,159 (Harvard 1997) (dis-
cussing how judges make "strategic choice[s]" about "how to deploy their resources for legal re-
search and writing" in the "medium" of law to bring about, if they can succeed, "the rule choices"
they think just).
394 See id at 159-60.
395 See Jack M. Beermann,A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with SpecialAttention to Sources
of Law, 42 Stan L Rev 51,101 (1989) (characterizing the Court's "manipulation of text, legislative
history and policy" as "transparent, especially when it jumps merrily from one source of law to an-
other").
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B. Institutional Role
Although it is sometimes said that judicial conservatives believe in a
narrow, deferential judicial role,"' the Rehnquist Court's federalism re-
vival constitutes a counterexample to that claim. In cases involving fed-
eralism, the Court-led by its most conservative justices-has either
wholly or partly invalidated at least ten acts of Congress within the past
seven years.3" My point here is not to accuse the pro-federalism majority
of failing to adhere to a consistent conservative philosophy. As I have
said, there are multiple strands of diverse judicially conservative phi-
losophies.'" In addition, principles that apply in one context may have
exceptions or may simply be outweighed in others. My point, instead, is
that the Court, determined to limit congressional power in the name of
federalism, has not been deferential. Nor, given the nature of its federal-
ist agenda, could it be.
Viewed from one perspective, the Court's reform agenda so far ap-
pears quite modest.39 As Robert Nagel has argued,7 across the sweep of
history the balance of constitutional federalism has tipped heavily in a
nationalist direction. Against the backdrop of the New Deal and the
Great Society and the judicial decisions that ratified them, Nagel con-
tends, the Court is attempting no more than a minor adjustment, neces-
sary to ensure that state and local governments retain integrity and vital-
ity. 40
When attention focuses just on the three principal paths along
which the Court has altered the balance of national and state preroga-
tives, this claim seems plausible. But a broadened view complicates the
picture. Beyond the principal paths of the Court's federalism revival lies
a thickening underbrush of subconstitutional doctrines comprising clear
statement rules, equitable doctrines restricting federal judicial power,
statutory interpretations that shield local governments from liability, and
official immunity doctrines. This underbrush is substantively inelegant
and methodologically undisciplined.a Moreover, as I have emphasized,
the Court's efforts to promote federalism are frequently entangled in,
396 See note 124 and accompanying text.
397 See note 2 and accompanying text. Of the ten cases cited in note 2 as wholly or partly invali-
dating federal statutes on federalism grounds, all but New York were decided within the past seven
years. In addition, City of Boerne, 521 US at 511 (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
in its application to state and local governments),is fairly classified as a case "involving judicial fed-
eralism," even though the Court's conclusion rested principally on separation-of-powers grounds.
398 See Part I.C.
399 See Althouse,31 Rutgers L J at 689 (cited in note 21) (characterizing the Court's federalism
cases as "reasonably moderate" because they have "for the most part sought to limit the way Con-
gress can do things, not place areas of regulation wholly off-limits to Congress").
40 See Nagel, 13 Ga St U L Rev at 987 (cited in note 6).
401 See id at 996-1004.
4M See notes 223-35,350-63 and accompanying text.
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and occasionally subordinate to, its substantively conservative disposi-
tions. Under the circumstances, the claim of judicial modesty could
scarcely disarm criticism by those with more liberal or nationalist views,
or even by those who hold a different conception of appropriate judicial
restraint.'4
C. Path Dependence and Doctrinal Complexity
In implementing a federalism revival, the Court has struggled to
reconcile competing goals. One is to afford a decent respect to stare de-
cisis. Another is to effect significant doctrinal reform to promote consti-
tutional federalism. In some doctrinal areas, the Court has tipped dis-
cernibly in one or the other direction. For example, the Court has moved
cautiously in restricting Congress's general regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause; in this doctrinal area, stare decisis and related consid-
erations of path dependence have had a significant constraining effect.4,4
By contrast, in the domain of sovereign immunity jurisprudence, the
Court has felt freer to overrule cases and otherwise revise the doctrinal
landscape.'4"
Often, however, the Court has attempted to achieve significant
change without overruling cases. Instead, the Court's pro-federalism ma-
jority has purported to leave leading cases undisturbed, while at the
same time surrounding them with exceptions and qualifications. A plain
example comes from Monell, which establishes that municipalities are
suable persons under Section 1983, but that liability cannot attach on a
respondeat superior basis.4' Although the Supreme Court has left Monell
formally intact since 1978, it has progressively stiffened the standards for
finding municipalities causally responsible for their employees' torts. 41
To cite just one more example of increasing complexity, although
continuing to affirm the basic rule of Young that state officials do not
partake of the states' immunity from suit and are suable for injunctions
to stop ongoing violations of federal law,'8 the Court has carved out a se-
ries of exceptions (even while a majority of even the conservative jus-
tices deny that they are employing a case-by-case balancing test"). The
Court thus has held that Young does not apply to suits in federal court
403 See, for example, Shapiro,31 Rutgers L J at 753-55 (cited in note 68) (attacking the Court's
development of immunity doctrines as being neither disciplined by constitutional text nor warranted
by history).
404 See Part HI.B.1.
405 See Part III.C.
406 436 US at 691.
407 See note 226 and accompanying text.
408 209 US at 167-68.
409 See notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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seeking to enjoin state officials from violating state law, nor to cases in
which it can be inferred that Congress meant other remedies to be exclu-
sive (even if Congress did not say so);41' nor to suits that implicate state
sovereign interests in ways that the Court deems fundamental.41 2 In the
tension between a commitment to pro-federalism change and to respect
for stare decisis, exception builds on exception.
Yet a further level of complexity comes into the picture as a result
of the Court's third, partly distinct goal of creating doctrines that either
promote or accord with its substantive conservatism. Consider the
Court's relatively recent practices in recognizing exceptions to Hans. As
noted above, the Court has developed exceptions-seemingly unrelated
to federalism-for suits to recover coercively collected taxes 41 and ap-
parently to compel the payment of just compensation for "takings" of
private property."
When the Court's reluctance to overrule cases is coupled with a
readiness to create exceptions and draw fine distinctions, and sometimes
to advance substantive as well as structural goals, federalism doctrine in-
evitably grows complex, and occasionally bewildering. In creating and
sustaining a complex doctrinal structure, the current Court has not nec-
essarily performed worse than its predecessors. '5 Doctrinal complexity
416bordering on contradiction has long persisted in federal courts doctrine.
But if the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival has not rendered federal
courts law dramatically less coherent, neither has it arrested the slide
into Byzantine complexity.
417
410 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89,117-21 (1984).
411 See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 74 (1996) (holding that specifically provided statutory reme-
dies preclude other remedies); Middlesex County SewerageAuthority v National Sea ClammersAsso-
ciation, 453 US 1,14 (1981) (same).
412 See Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 US 261,281 (1997).
413 See notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
414 See note 367 and accompanying text.
415 In addition, it is only fair to emphasize that the Court lacks a collective mind. Decisions re-
flect the sum of the votes of justices who may have different rationales for reaching an agreed result.
See generally Easterbrook, 95 Harv L Rev at 813 (cited in note 22) (noting the difficulties of collec-
tive decisionmaking and explaining why some criticisms of the Court are therefore unfair). In an ex-
treme but readily imaginable situation, eight of the nine justices voting in a 5-4 decision might be-
lieve the case at bar to be indistinguishable from a precedent that four justices would follow and four
justices would overrule. But if one justice believed that the precedent could and should be distin-
guished, there would be no majority to overrule the precedent, and an "exception" would enter (and
complicate) the doctrine.
416 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va L Rev 1141,1142
(1988) (complaining that "[t]he law of judicial federalism ... is wracked by internal contradictions").
417 But see Fried, 109 Harv L Rev at 76-77 (cited in note 6) (suggesting that the Rehnquist
Court "may be clearing away" the "detritus" left by the less principled Warren and Burger Courts).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article I have offered an overview of the Supreme Court's
federalism revival, and in doing so have attempted to put both the parts
and the whole in a fresh perspective. In commentary on the Court's fed-
eralism agenda, three lines of cases have dominated attention. That at-
tention is merited, but it should not obscure surrounding developments.
If the federalism revolution has proceeded along three main paths, im-
portant developments have also occurred along a variety of subpaths.
Moreover, the rates of advance along the various paths have varied
widely. Indeed, there are some available paths for the promotion of con-
stitutional federalism along which nothing has occurred.
In seeking to explain this pattern, I have emphasized the widely rec-
ognized judicial conservatism of the current Supreme Court, in particular
the relation between "substantive" and "methodological" conservatism
and a commitment to constitutional federalism.The term "conservatism"
does not denote a single philosophy so much as encompass a family of
related, but occasionally mutually inconsistent, dispositions. Amid the
competition internal to judicial conservatism, a commitment to federal-
ism by no means always predominates. In order to make sense of the
overall structure of federalism jurisprudence, it is crucial to understand
that the Court's prevailing majority is at least as substantively conserva-
tive as it is pro-federalism. The Court's substantive conservatism helps to
explain the existence of what I have called "quiet fronts" in the federal-
ism revolution. It also helps to explain otherwise puzzling exceptions to
the general rule that sovereign immunity protects the states from uncon-
sented private suits for damages. This rule must yield, the Court has sug-
gested, in cases involving takings and coercive collections of taxes-two
types of "old property" rights of which substantive conservatives tend to
be solicitous.
My second explanatory theme involves path dependence. The Court
has proceeded cautiously along doctrinal paths where previous efforts to
protect federalism occasioned embarrassment, where reliance interests
make dramatic change difficult, and where the attentive public has con-
spicuously embraced prevailing doctrine. By contrast, the Court has pro-
ceeded most vigorously in sovereign immunity cases, in which the way
has appeared clear for notable reforms.
More needs to be said, however, to explain the place of sovereignimmunity in the federalism revolution. At its center, the doctrine protects
states-but only states-from private suits for damages. Sovereign im-
munity does not restrict the regulatory power of Congress, it seldom bars
suits for injunctions to force compliance with federal law, and it does not
protect local governments at all. Why, then, has the Court made sover-
eign immunity a centerpiece of its drive to revive constitutional federal-
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ism? In answering this question, I have argued that sovereign immunity
needs to be seen in context, as one of an arsenal of doctrines -most of
them technical and subconstitutional-that the Court has employed to
shield state and local governments from damages liability. In affording
protections from damages liability, the Court has not relied on a single
elegant strategy, but on a congeries of mutually supportive tactics.
Overall, there is both less and more to the federalism revolution
than generally meets the eye. There is less consistency; the federalism
revolution has not advanced equally along all fronts. In addition, two of
the main paths have exhibited fewer grand developments than some
might have predicted. But a broadened perspective also reveals more
than is sometimes noticed, as the Court has pushed its federalism agenda
along a myriad of subpaths, mostly involving subconstitutional doctrines
and statutory interpretation. Individually, the steps may be small, but
their cumulative impact is large.
If the Supreme Court is implementing a federalism revolution, it is
thus distinctively a lawyers' revolution.Though the rhetoric is sometimes
audacious, few landmarks have toppled. Much of the significance, if not
the devil himself, inhabits the details.
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